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PATENTLY INCONSISTENT:
STATE AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY IN INTER PARTES REVIEW*
JOHN MIXON†
INTRODUCTION
From 2016 to 2017, the Patent Trial and Appeals Board
(“PTAB” or the “Board”), an adjudicatory branch of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”),1 instituted five
separate inter partes review (“IPR”) proceedings against patents
owned by various state universities.2 Upon instituting these
proceedings, the universities all moved to dismiss the

*

Currently, there is no consensus regarding the appropriate nomenclature that
should be used to refer to the indigenous groups known as American Indians or
Native Americans due to various factors such as culture, geographic region, and
individual preference. Throughout this Note, the terms “Native American” and
“Indian” are used interchangeably due to such lack of consensus and the fact that
the cases addressing Native American sovereignty use the terms “Indians” and
“Native Americans” interchangeably.
†
Senior Staff Member, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2020, St. John’s
University School of Law; B.S. 2016, SUNY Cortland. Thank you to Professor
Subotnik for her invaluable guidance and insight throughout the Note-writing
process and to my family for their support throughout my time in law school.
1
The USPTO is the federal agency responsible for “granting U.S. patents and
registering trademarks.” About Us, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/about-us (last updated Mar. 12, 2019). Within the USPTO,
the PTAB is responsible for issuing decisions on patent appeals and post-grant
challenges. About PTAB, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/
patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/about-ptab (last updated
Mar. 14, 2019).
2
See LSI Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01068, 2017 WL
6517562 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017); Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No.
IPR2017-01186, 2017 WL 6517563 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017); Reactive Surfaces Ltd.,
LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-01914, 2017 WL 2992429 (P.T.A.B. July 13,
2017); NeoChord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., No. IPR2016-00208, 2017 Pat. App. LEXIS
12969 (P.T.A.B. May 23, 2017); Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc.,
No. IPR2016-01274, 2017 WL 4015009 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017).
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proceedings on state sovereign immunity grounds.3 While only
three of these proceedings resulted in the dismissal of the state
entities,4 the cumulative effect of the five proceedings was that
state-owned patents are clearly insulated from IPR proceedings
by state sovereign immunity so long as the state does not
(1) bring a federal patent infringement suit or (2) transfer all
substantive rights in the patent in question to a separate third
party.5
Perhaps inspired by these developments, the pharmaceutical
company Allergan adopted a noteworthy approach to the IPRs
that were instituted against six of its patents on December 8,
2016.6 Attempting to avoid the proceedings, Allergan assigned
all of its rights in the six patents to the Saint Regis Mohawk
Tribe, a federally recognized Indian tribe.7 The tribe then moved
to dismiss the proceedings based on tribal sovereign immunity.8
However, in Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk
Tribe (Mylan I), the PTAB found that unlike states, tribes could
not use their sovereign immunity to avoid IPRs.9 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the
PTAB’s holding in Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan
Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Mylan II).10 As a result of these decisions,
there was a brief inconsistency between how tribal sovereign
immunity was treated and how state sovereign immunity was
treated in IPR proceedings11 until the recent decision in Regents
of the University of Minnesota v. LSI Corp.12 In that case, the
Federal Circuit corrected course by holding that state sovereign
3
See LSI, 2017 WL 6517562, at *1; Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *1; Reactive
Surfaces, 2017 WL 2992429, at *1; NeoChord, 2017 Pat. App. LEXIS 12969, at *3–4;
Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1.
4
See Reactive Surfaces, 2017 WL 2992429, at *1; NeoChord, 2017 Pat. App.
LEXIS 12969, at *31; Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1.
5
See LSI, 2017 WL 6517562, at *3–4; Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *3–4;
Reactive Surfaces, 2017 WL 2992429, at *6–7; NeoChord, 2017 Pat. App. LEXIS
12969, at *30–31; Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *17.
6
Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe (Mylan I), No. IPR201601127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (per curiam).
7
Id. at *2.
8
Id. at *1.
9
Id. at *15.
10
896 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019).
11
Compare Mylan II, 896 F.3d at 1326, and Mylan I, 2018 WL 1100950, at *15,
with Reactive Surfaces, 2017 WL 2992429, at *1, and NeoChord, 2017 Pat. App.
LEXIS 12969, at *31, and Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1.
12
Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2019).
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immunity may not be applied in IPRs.13 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court can still potentially grant certiorari and reverse
the Federal Circuit’s decision, which would result in the
inconsistency between state and tribal sovereign immunity in
IPRs being revived.14
This Note is composed of four parts. Part I reviews the
origins, development, and purpose of both tribal and state
sovereign immunity, compares the two doctrines, and concludes
that the two are functionally the same despite deriving from
different historical roots. Part II provides an overview of the
history and purpose behind the patent system, the America
Invents Act, and IPRs. Part II also analyzes the constitutionality
of IPRs, as decided by the Supreme Court in Oil States Energy
Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC.15
Part III
introduces and addresses the five IPR decisions on state
sovereign immunity, Mylan I, and Mylan II. In addition, it
discusses the PTAB’s internal inconsistency in applying state
and tribal sovereign immunity and the inconsistency between the
PTAB’s state sovereign immunity precedent and the Federal
Circuit’s rationale and holding in Mylan II. Finally, Part IV of
this Note argues that (1) the Federal Circuit’s Mylan II holding is
correct; (2) policy implications dictate that sovereign immunity of
either form should not apply in IPRs; and (3) if the Supreme
Court grants ceriorari in LSI Corp., Mylan II’s holding, as well as
the LSI Corp. holding should be read to prohibit both state and
tribal immunity equally because of the similarity between the
two doctrines.

13

Id.
See Appellant University of Minnesota’s Motion to Stay Issuance of the
Mandate Pending Filing and Disposition of a Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme
Court at 3, Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2019) (No. 18-1559) [hereinafter University of Minnesota’s Motion to Stay]. See also
Matthew J. Rizzolo & Kyle Tsui, Federal Circuit Confirms That State Sovereign
Immunity, Like Tribal Immunity, Cannot Shield Patents from AIA Patent
Challenges, Ropes & Gray: Alert (June 17, 2019), https://www.ropesgray.com/en/
news room/alerts/2019/06/Federal-Circuit-Confirms-that-State-Sovereign-ImmunityLike-Tribal-Immunity-Cannot-Shield (speculating that the Supreme Court will
grant certiorari).
15
138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).
14
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TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY VERSUS STATE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
The Origins, Development & Purpose of Tribal Sovereign
Immunity

The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity provides that
Native American tribes recognized by the United States may not
be subjected to lawsuits brought by states, private individuals, or
private entities.16 Although this doctrine as we know it today is a
creature of federal common law,17 it is nonetheless firmly
engrained in the legal doctrine of the United States18 and has
historical roots that date back to before the United States
Constitution was ratified.19
1.

The Historical Roots of Tribal Sovereign Immunity

According to Felix S. Cohen,20 the relation between the rights
of Native Americans and Europeans in the Americas was first
formally clarified by Francisco de Victoria in 1532.21 Victoria was
16

Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788–789 (2014).
See Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g,
476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986) (“The common law sovereign immunity possessed by the
Tribe is a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance.” (citing
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978))).
18
Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998) (“[T]he
doctrine of tribal immunity is settled law . . . .”).
19
Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 788 (“[Native American tribes] remain ‘separate
sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution.’ ” (quoting Martinez, 436 U.S. at 56)); see
also Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (inferring that
tribes had immunity from suit prior to the Constitutional Convention in stating that
“it would be absurd to suggest that the tribes surrendered immunity in a convention
to which they were not even parties”). Upon declaring its independence, the United
States “followed Britain’s example and recognized and interacted with indigenous
Nations as separate sovereigns.” Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and
Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and
Normative Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37
TULSA L. REV. 661, 684 (2002). Such recognition evolved into the judicially created
tribal sovereign immunity doctrine that we know today. See id. at 682–99.
20
Felix S. Cohen was revered by many, including Justice Frankfurter, for his
work in shaping Native American Law. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, at viii–ix (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982 ed., The
Michie Co. 1982) (“Cohen was the Blackstone of American Indian law.”); Felix
Frankfurter, Foreword to Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV.
355, 356 (1954) (stating that “[o]nly a ripe and imaginative scholar with a
synthesizing faculty would have brought luminous order out of such a mish-mash” in
reference to Cohen’s work on the 1942 version of the Handbook of Federal Indian
Law).
21
COHEN, supra note 20, at 50.
17
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a “leading Spanish intellectual and academic” during the 1500s
who had been tasked with advising Spain on how Spanish rights
in the Americas interacted with Native American rights.22 Upon
studying various property rights theories that could possibly
allow the Spanish to take Indian land, Victoria concluded that
Europeans had no right to Indian land unless the Indians
voluntarily handed it over to them.23
Victoria’s conclusion was meant to accord respect to Indian
tribes as sovereign nations and led to Spanish treaties, laws, and
charters recognizing Indian tribes as sovereign nations.24
Victoria’s view of Native American sovereignty eventually
became widely adopted by European nations, and although there
were many instances of ethnocentric invasion and improper
taking of Native American land,25 most of the land obtained by
Europeans settling in colonial America was purchased from
Native American tribes.26 In fact, according to Cohen, the
recognition of tribes as sovereign nations was so widespread that
it was accepted by international law scholars of the sixteenth,
seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, who were then cited as
authority in federal cases, such as Johnson v. M’Intosh, one of
the earliest United States Supreme Court cases involving Native
American rights.27
2.

The Marshall Trilogy & the Doctrine’s Subsequent
Developments

Even more telling of tribal sovereignty than federal court
citations to colonial-era treatises is the fact that the United
States Constitution explicitly refers to Native American tribes as

22

Id.
Id. at 50–51.
24
Id. at 51–52.
25
Id. at 52–53 (“Although the actions of Spanish conquistadores and
government administrators often contrasted sharply with the principles expressed in
these doctrines, generally such actions violated rather than reflected existing
Spanish law. . . . These tenets were adhered to in the earliest dealings between
European settlers and Indians.”).
26
See id. at 52–58.
27
Id. at 52 & nn.19–20; see also Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,
563–65, 567–71 (1823) (citing various natural and international law writers, such as
Emmerich de Vattel and Hugo Grotius). Hugo Grotius was a seventeenth-century
scholar, and Emmerich de Vattel was an eighteenth-century scholar. See F. S.
Ruddy, International Law and the Enlightenment: Vattel and the 18th Century, 3
INT’L LAW. 839, 839, 841 (1969) (discussing Grotius’s and Vattel’s work).
23
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entities separate from the states28 and grants the president the
power to make treaties with them as if they are a sovereign
nation.29 Indeed, to an extent, it was these constitutional
predicates that the Supreme Court relied on in a series of three
cases where it recognized Indian tribes as sovereign nations.30
These three cases are known as the Marshall Trilogy.31
The first of these cases, Johnson v. M’Intosh, involved a
dispute over land that the Piankeshaw Indians sold to the
plaintiff’s family prior to the end of the American Revolution.32
Following the Revolution, Virginia passed an act reclaiming all
land that had previously been deeded by Indian tribes to private
individuals, including the land that had been deeded to the
plaintiff.33 Subsequently, Virginia conveyed the reclaimed land
to the United States, which then sold the parcel that had been
deeded to the plaintiff to the defendant.34 This caused there to be
two “owners” of the land.35 In resolving the issue, the Supreme
Court held that the tribe’s sale was invalid because, among other
things, treaties that had previously been entered into between
the tribe and the United States had ceded the land in question to

28

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes . . . .”).
29
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 519–
20 (1832) (“The constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to
be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous
treaties with the Indian nations, and, consequently, admits their rank among those
powers who are capable of making treaties.”).
30
See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 519–20 (holding that a Georgia statute did
not apply on the Cherokee Nation’s reservation because the United States had the
sole authority to enter treaties with Indian tribes and had in fact entered into
treaties with the tribe, which recognized it as a sovereign nation; thus, the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution prevented state law from applying in the
tribal territory); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18–20 (1831)
(holding that although the Commerce Clause recognizes Indian tribes as sovereign,
they are not foreign nations, but instead sovereign nations that are dependent on
the United States); M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 593–94 (holding that a tribal sale
of land was invalid because, among other things, the treaties between the tribe and
the United States allowed for annulment of the sale and, since the tribe did not
annul the agreement while it was at war with the United States, it was presumed
that the tribe considered the deal to be void).
31
See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946, 963 (9th Cir. 2017); U.S.
v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635, 642 (8th Cir. 2003); Seielstad, supra note 19, at 686.
32
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 571–72.
33
Id. at 585–86.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 562–63.
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the United States.36 Based on the Court’s reliance on such
treaties, it is clear that the Court viewed the tribe as a sovereign
nation independently capable of diplomatic relations with the
United States.
Eight years after M’Intosh, the Supreme Court again dealt
with Native American sovereignty rights in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia.37 In this case the state of Georgia tried to extend its
laws into the Cherokee Nation.38 In response, the Cherokee
Nation claimed to be a foreign nation and filed for an injunction
directly to the Supreme Court to give the Court original
jurisdiction over the matter.39 Ultimately, Chief Justice Marshall
determined that the text of the Commerce Clause40 and the
nature of the relationship between Indian tribes and the United
States indicated that tribes were not foreign states, but rather
“domestic dependent nations.”41 This meant that they were a
hybrid sovereign because they were self-governing entities
distinct from states that also relied on the United States for
protection like “a ward to his guardian.”42
One year after Cherokee Nation, Chief Justice Marshall
issued the majority opinion in Worcester v. Georgia.43 In this
case, the petitioner, a white male, was convicted for violating a
Georgia law that required “all white persons[] residing within the
limits of the Cherokee nation” to obtain a license and to take an
oath of loyalty to the state of Georgia.44 The petitioner appealed
36
Id. at 593–94. It is unclear from the opinion which treaty Chief Justice
Marshall was referring to, but there were several treaties that the United States
had entered into with various different tribes, including the Piankeshaw tribe,
whereby the tribes relinquished their ownership rights of their land to the United
States. See, e.g., Treaty with the Piankeshaw, Aug. 27, 1804, art. I, 7 Stat. 83;
Treaty with the Eel River, etc., Aug. 7, 1803, 7 Stat. 77; Jon D. May, Piankashaw,
HIST.
SOC’Y,
https://www.okhistory.org/publications/enc/entry.php?
OKLA.
entry=PI001 (last visited June 1, 2019).
37
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
38
Id. at 15.
39
Id. at 15–16; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cls. 1–2 (extending the judicial
power to “all Cases . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign states”
and granting original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in “all Cases . . . in which a
State shall be Party”).
40
The Commerce Clause provides, “The Congress shall have Power . . . To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian tribes . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
41
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17–20.
42
Id. at 17.
43
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), abrogated by Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353
(2001).
44
Id. at 515–16.
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his conviction, and the Supreme Court determined that states
have no authority to enforce laws on Indian soil because treaties
between the United States and Indians recognized Indians as
“distinct, independent political communities.”45 The Court also
clarified that the United States has exclusive authority to deal
with Indian tribes.46
While the Marshall Trilogy did not address tribal sovereign
immunity per se, the principles set forth in these cases formed
the foundation of the doctrine by recognizing Indian tribes as
sovereign.47 These principles were that: (1) Native American
tribes’ sovereignty derives from the fact that they were
indigenous to the Americas and from their relations with
European settlers, relations the United States subsequently
acknowledged and adopted upon its formation;48 (2) only the
federal government may abrogate or weaken such sovereignty;49
and (3) tribes’ sovereignty is a hybrid between that of the states
and foreign nations, as they are located inside the United States
without being part of the union, but also depend on the United
States for protection.50 In fact, these principles resurfaced nearly
two decades after Worcester in Parks v. Ross, where the Court
held that an officer of the Cherokee Nation could not be held
liable for actions taken in his official tribal capacity because
“[t]he Cherokees are in many respects a foreign and independent
nation.”51 This was one of the first cases to suggest that tribes
and their officers are not subject to suit due to tribal sovereignty,
but it certainly was not the last.52
45

Id. at 519.
Id. at 520.
47
See Seielstad, supra note 19, at 689 (“[T]he fact that a form of inherent
sovereignty was recognized is significant to the development of other principles of
tribal sovereignty such as the doctrine of tribal immunity.”).
48
Seielstad, supra note 19, at 688.
49
Id. While abrogation or weakening of tribal sovereignty is still exclusively the
power of the federal government, it is worth noting that the power of states to
enforce laws in tribal territory is no longer as impermissible as it was after the
Marshall Trilogy. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361–62 (2001). Nevertheless,
States maintain limited authority on tribal lands. Id.
50
See Seielstad, supra note 19, at 688–89; see also Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at
519–20; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
51
52 U.S. (11 How.) 362, 374 (1850).
52
It is worth noting that about two decades after Parks, Congress shifted away
from diplomatic relations with tribes in favor of regulating tribes through
legislation. See 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2012). This placed the power of Indian affairs
exclusively in the control of Congress, while still recognizing the validity of all
preexisting tribal treaties. Id.
46
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In 1883, the Supreme Court resolved Ex parte
Kan-gi-shun-ca, which involved the imprisonment and death
sentence of a Sioux Indian for the murder of another Sioux
Indian.53 The imprisoned Indian filed a writ of habeas corpus,
and the Court determined that since Congress did not clearly
intend for the statute in question to encompass Indian-on-Indian
crimes occurring on tribal land, the lower court that convicted
the petitioner did not have jurisdiction over him.54 Though the
Court did not expressly declare that tribes were immune from
suit, it communicated the principle that if tribes were to be
subject to suit, Congress would have to pass legislation indicating
a clear and unequivocal intent to do so.55
Shortly thereafter, the principle requiring clear and
unequivocal intent was reaffirmed and built upon by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Thebo v.
Choctaw Tribe of Indians.56 In Choctaw, a United States citizen
sued the Choctaw Tribe and some of its officers to recover
outstanding attorney’s fees owed to the citizen.57 In resolving the
case, the court relied on the “clear and unequivocal intent”
standard to determine that there was no jurisdiction over the
Choctaw Tribe.58 In fact, the court took this principle even
further and stated that tribes “have been placed by the United
States, substantially, on the plane occupied by the states under
the [E]leventh [A]mendment to the [C]onstitution,”59 which
illustrates that the court unquestionably viewed the tribe as
deserving of the respect typically accorded to sovereigns.

53

109 U.S. 556, 557 (1883).
Id. at 572.
55
Id. This principle is still present in the modern tribal sovereign immunity
doctrine. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 790 (2014)
(alterations in original) (“Our decisions establish as well that such a congressional
decision must be clear. The baseline position, we have often held, is tribal immunity;
and ‘[t]o abrogate [such] immunity, Congress must “unequivocally” express that
purpose.’ ” (quoting C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla.,
532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001))).
56
66 F. 372, 376 (1895) (stating that “[i]t has been the settled policy of congress
not to sanction suits generally against the[] Indian Nations” and if it is “[t]he
intention of congress to [subject Native Americans to suit, such intention] would
have to be expressed in plain and unambiguous terms”). While this was only a
circuit court case, the Supreme Court cited to this decision for support in what many
consider to be the first case of the modern tribal immunity decisions. See infra notes
63–65.
57
66 F. at 373.
58
Id. at 376.
59
Id.
54
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In tracing these tribal cases up to this point, it should be
noted that the courts’ and Congress’s view of tribes as sovereign
nations and on subjecting them to suit has evolved and allowed
for some exceptions.60 However, the ultimate lessons from the
cases that built upon the Marshall Trilogy are that: (1) despite
courts not explicitly mentioning tribal sovereign immunity by
name, the doctrine started to rear its head in the form of a
jurisdictional bar that only Congress could allow circumvention
of; and (2) despite Congress’s shift away from diplomacy with the
tribes, the rationale for the doctrine remained rooted in the
understanding that Native American tribes are sovereign, selfgoverning nations.61 With that background, the following cases
mark the start of what many consider the “modern era” of the
tribal sovereign immunity doctrine.62
3.

The Modern Era of Tribal Sovereign Immunity

The first of these modern tribal immunity cases is United
States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., which was
decided in 1940.63 In this case, the Supreme Court determined
that although the United States could recover a bankruptcy
judgment on behalf of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, the
nations were not subject to cross-claims stemming from the same
proceeding.64 The Court’s rationale was that there is a “public
policy which exempt[s] . . . dependent as well as . . . dominant
sovereignties from suit without consent” and “Indian Nations are
exempt from suit without Congressional authorization.”65

60
See Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556, 570, 572 (1883) (recognizing an
exception that Indian-on-Indian crimes are exempt from the jurisdiction of United
States courts).
61
See id. at 572; see also supra text accompanying note 60.
62
See Brandon Andersen, Tribal Sovereign Immunity at the Patent and
Trademark Office, 100 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 332, 336 (2018); Seielstad,
supra note 19, at 694.
63
309 U.S. 506 (1940).
64
Id. at 510–12. The United States was acting on behalf of the Choctaw and
Chickasaw Nations in this case because the governments of these nations were
dissolved pursuant to statute. Id. at 512.
65
Id. (first citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); then
citing Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919); Adams v. Murphy, 165 F.
304 (8th Cir. 1908); Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 372 (8th Cir. 1895)).
The Court elaborated that because tribes possess immunity “from direct
suit . . . [they] possess[] a similar immunity from cross-suits” because a “sovereignty
possessing immunity should not be compelled to defend against cross-actions away
from its own territory or in courts, not of its own choice, merely because its debtor
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Nearly three decades later, the Supreme Court doubled down
on its U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. holding in Puyallup Tribe,
Inc. v. Department of Game.66 The issue in Puyallap was whether
the Washington Department of Game could sue tribe members
for violating state fishing regulations on the Puyallup Tribal
reservation.67 In holding that the Puyallup Tribe was immune
from suit, the Court reaffirmed that “[a]bsent an effective waiver
or consent, it is settled that a state court may not exercise
jurisdiction over a recognized Indian tribe.”68
The following year, the Supreme Court decided Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, which involved the relatively new Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”).69 Congress adopted the ICRA
to apply certain individual rights from the United States
Constitution to tribal governments.70 One such right that
Congress included in the ICRA—which was at issue in Santa
Clara Pueblo71—is equal protection of the law.72 In Santa Clara
Pueblo, a woman filed suit against the Santa Clara Pueblo Tribe
claiming it violated Title I of the ICRA because children of male
members who married outside the tribe could be recognized as
tribe members, but children of females married outside the tribe
could not, which deprived her children of rights such as voting in
tribal elections and inheriting land.73 The Supreme Court held
that despite the tribe’s violation of the ICRA, “suits against the
tribe under the ICRA are barred by its sovereign immunity” since
there was no “unequivocal expression of contrary legislative
intent.”74

was unavailable except outside the jurisdiction of the sovereign’s consent.” Id. at
513.
66
433 U.S. 165 (1977).
67
Id. at 167–68.
68
Id. at 172.
69
436 U.S. 49 (1978).
70
Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights
at Thirty Years, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 465, 467 (1998) (“The central purpose of the ICRA
was to apply most of the provisions of the Constitution’s Bill of Rights to tribal
governments.”).
71
See 436 U.S. at 51.
72
25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8) (2018) (“No Indian tribe in exercising powers of selfgovernment shall—deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
its laws . . . .”).
73
436 U.S. at 51–52.
74
Id. at 59. In dissent, Justice White argued that Congress had a clear implicit
intent to make tribes amenable to federal jurisdiction because the whole point of the
ICRA was to “provide [American Indians] with the guarantee of equal protection of
the laws” and by making tribes immune to suit the majority “denie[d] them access to
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Shortly after Santa Clara, the Court decided Three Affiliated
Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering in which
it held that a state may not condition a tribe’s ability to file suit
against a non-Indian in state court on the tribe’s waiver of its
own tribal sovereign immunity.75 Five years later the Supreme
Court again dealt with a state trying to subject a tribe to suit
without its consent.76 In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, the Court held that
tribal sovereign immunity bars states from collecting sales tax on
goods sold by the Potawatomi tribe to other Indians while states
“remain[] free to collect taxes on sales to nonmembers of the
tribe.”77 In so holding, Chief Justice Rehnquist reiterated the
principle from U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. that tribal sovereign
immunity also prevents the tribe from being subjected to
counterclaims in suits that it files.78
Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist underscored that
since Native American tribes are “ ‘domestic dependent nations’
that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members
and territories,” they cannot be sued without a “clear waiver by
the tribe or congressional abrogation.”79 In support of upholding
the doctrine, Chief Justice Rehnquist deferred to the fact that
tribal immunity is a “long-established principle” of the Court that
has been consistently approved by Congress.80 As a result,
Potawatomi dug the roots of the doctrine further into the ground

the federal courts to enforce this right.” Id. at 74 (White, J., dissenting). However, as
the majority pointed out, “[t]ribal forums are available to vindicate rights created by
the ICRA” and such forums are obligated to apply the ICRA as the law. Id. at 65
(majority opinion). Nonetheless, even if there was an implicit intent by Congress to
make tribes amenable to suit in federal court, as the majority stated, “[i]t is settled
that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally
expressed.’ ” Id. at 58 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)).
75
476 U.S. 877, 889 (1986) (“[T]hose statutory conditions may be met only at an
unacceptably high price to tribal sovereignty and thus operate to effectively bar the
Tribe from the courts.”). In so holding, the Court made clear that while it may seem
like an inequity to allow tribes to sue, but not reciprocally be sued, it is no different
from how “the United States or [individual states may] sue in cases where they could
not be sued as defendants because of their sovereign immunity.” Id. at 893.
76
See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498
U.S. 505, 507–08 (1991).
77
Id. at 507.
78
Id. at 509–10.
79
Id. at 509 (first quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17
(1831); then citing Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58).
80
Id. at 510.
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and made clear that unless Congress says otherwise, it is here to
stay.81
Seven years after the Court decided Potawatomi, the Court
echoed that sentiment when it allowed a Kiowa Tribe-owned
commercial entity to avoid contract liability for business that was
transacted off of the tribe’s land.82 Writing for the Court, Justice
Kennedy acknowledged that while tribal immunity may “extend[]
beyond what is needed” in our modern society, it is nonetheless
grounded as federal law and is solely in the hands of the tribe to
waive or Congress to abrogate or limit.83
Sixteen years later, the Court reaffirmed Kiowa’s holding
when it found in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community that
tribal sovereign immunity prevented Michigan from filing suit
against Bay Mills Indian Community for opening a casino on
non-tribal lands.84 The crux of Bay Mills’s holding is that courts
“will not lightly assume that Congress in fact intend[ed] to
undermine Indian self-government” and that Congress must
unequivocally express its desire to abrogate tribal immunity.85
As such, since the section of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(“IGRA”) in question only made tribes amenable to suit for
“gaming activity located on Indian lands,” Bay Mills was immune
from Michigan’s suit for opening its casino off the reservation.86
A review of tribal sovereign immunity from the colonial era
to the present makes abundantly clear that the modern doctrine
is based on the recognition of tribes as dependent sovereign

81

See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 753–54, 760 (1998).
83
Id. at 758–60; see also infra note 169 and accompanying text. In addition to
calling the necessity of the doctrine into doubt, the Court went as far as saying that
the doctrine “developed almost by accident.” 523 U.S. at 756. However, such a
characterization is a misreading of the doctrine’s history because having analyzed
tribal immunity up to this point, it is clear that Indian sovereignty has been
recognized since before the Constitution and such sovereignty is at the heart of
federal court decisions that have allowed Indians to avoid suit since the Founding.
See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. None of the Court’s doubts matter of
course as they were expressed in dicta and the Court begrudgingly acknowledged
that tribal immunity is settled law. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 756.
84
572 U.S. 782, 785 (2014).
85
Id. at 790 (citations omitted).
86
Id. at 787, 803–04. In fact, the Court even acknowledged that allowing the
tribe to be sued for on-reservation gaming, but not off-reservation gaming, appears
to create “an apparent anomaly.” Id. at 794. However, in acknowledging this, the
Court said that it “does not revise legislation,” that “Congress wrote the statute it
wrote,” and that “ ‘Congress must “unequivocally” express [its] purpose’ to subject a
tribe to litigation.” Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
82
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nations that are entitled to self-government—subject to
Congress’s plenary power.87 This recognition in turn derived
from a combination of sources consisting of tribal treaties, the
Constitution, and colonial-era laws and traditions that served the
purpose of according Native Americans the respect and dignity to
which self-governing sovereigns are traditionally entitled.88
B.

The Origins, Development & Purpose of State Sovereign
Immunity

State sovereign immunity is just what it sounds like: a legal
doctrine that gives a state the right to avoid being hauled into
court as a defendant without its consent.89 Similar in many
respects to the origins of tribal sovereign immunity, the roots of
state sovereign immunity predate the ratification of the
Constitution.90 However, unlike tribal sovereign immunity, there
is no clear consensus among scholars as to the exact
pre-Constitution source for state immunity.91 Nonetheless, one of
the most widely accepted theories about state immunity’s origins,
which the Supreme Court has subscribed to, is that despite
rejecting most British common law traditions, “the doctrine that
a sovereign could not be sued without its consent was universal
in the States when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.”92
87
See id. at 788 (“Among the core aspects of sovereignty that tribes possess—
subject, again, to congressional action—is the ‘common-law immunity from suit
traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.’ ” (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978))).
88
See supra Section I.A.1.
89
Scott Dodson, The Metes and Bounds of State Sovereign Immunity, 29
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 721, 721 (2002).
90
See id. at 727; Katherine Florey, Insufficiently Jurisdictional: The Case
Against Treating State Sovereign Immunity as an Article III Doctrine, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 1375, 1385–86 (2004).
91
While many say that the states assumed sovereign immunity from when they
were colonies as a result of the King’s immunity, see, e.g., Dodson, supra note 89, at
727; Miles McCann, State Sovereign Immunity, NAGTRI J.: EMERGING ISSUES FOR
ATT’YS GEN. OFFS., November 2017, at 12, others are skeptical of this theory and
believe that this was never an assumption of the states. See, e.g., John J. Gibbons,
The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1895–99, 1913 (1983) (arguing that there was no inherent
understanding that state sovereign immunity existed in colonial America as a
carryover from Britain and insinuating that the alternative theory that such an
understanding of immunity was evident during the ratifying conventions is a
misunderstanding based on “[a] few isolated remarks”).
92
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715–16 (1999); see also Fed. Mar. Comm’n v.
S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751–52 (2002) (“States, upon ratification of the
Constitution, did not consent to become mere appendages of the Federal
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Because there is no clear-cut consensus among scholars, and
because the Supreme Court has indeed subscribed to the theory
that the doctrine was inherently carried over from Britain, this
Note assumes arguendo that this theory is historically accurate.93
1.

The Historical Roots of State Sovereign Immunity

The British common law accorded the King immunity from
suit based on the theory that “the King can do no wrong.”94 The
interpretation of this adage that has been relied on to
understand sovereign immunity is that unless the British Crown
consented to suits filed against it, the King was “not amenable to
any other earthly power or jurisdiction . . . so as to render him
answerable for [his actions] personally to his people.”95 Although
the American people rejected many of the legal and political
principles of England upon declaring their independence,96 they
simultaneously and universally accepted “the doctrine that a
sovereign could not be sued without its consent.”97 In fact, the
Supreme Court has even quoted the Federalist Papers and
records from state ratifying conventions to support this
contention.98
Government. Rather, they entered the Union ‘with their sovereignty intact.’ An
integral component of that ‘residuary and inviolable sovereignty’ retained by the
States is their immunity from private suits.” (citations omitted)).
93
Whether or not the American version of state sovereign immunity truly was
assumed by the states as a carryover from the Crown is irrelevant to this Note’s
argument because if this is indeed historically accurate, it would put tribal and state
sovereign immunity on equal footing, and if it is not actually historically
accurate⎯and the doctrine was not assumed to exist upon declaring independence—
then it would actually mean tribal sovereign immunity has stronger historical roots
than state sovereign immunity.
94
Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201,
1201 (2001); McCann, supra note 91, at 12 n.8.
95
Herbert Broom, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS, CLASSIFIED AND
ILLUSTRATED 43 (1845). There is also a second interpretation that means that
the prerogative of the Crown extends not to do any injury, because it is
created for the benefit of the people, and, therefore, cannot be exerted to
their prejudice—it being a fundamental general rule, that the king cannot
sanction any act forbidden by law; and it is in this point of view that he is
under, and not above the laws[]—that he is bound by them equally with his
subjects.
Id. This interpretation is not, however, the basis of understanding the sovereign
immunity that British common law stipulated.
96
Chemerinsky, supra note 94, at 1202 (“The United States was founded on a
rejection of a monarchy and of royal prerogatives.”).
97
Alden, 527 U.S. at 715–16.
98
The Court quoted THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) in stating,
“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
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Despite such universal acceptance of the doctrine when the
Constitution was drafted and ratified, the actual text of the
Constitution did not acknowledge state sovereign immunity’s
existence when it was ratified.99
Not surprisingly, this
constitutional omission quickly became an issue; and five years
after the Constitution’s ratification, the Supreme Court decided
Chisholm v. Georgia, where a South Carolina citizen filed suit
against the state of Georgia.100 In deciding the case, four of the
five justices found that Georgia was subject to suits brought by
citizens of other states based on the explicit language of Article
III of the Constitution.101
As a direct reaction to the outcome of Chisholm,
Congressional representatives quickly proposed resolutions for
an eleventh amendment, and the following year the Eleventh
Amendment was passed.102 The Eleventh Amendment provides,
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”103 As a result, the
amendment effectively overturned Chisholm, although it does

individual without its consent. . . . Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this
immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States . . . . Id. at
716–17. The Court then took quotes from the Virginia ratifying convention where
James Madison said, “[i]t is not in the power of individuals to call any state into
court,” and John Marshall said, “[w]ith respect to disputes between a state and the
citizens of another state, its jurisdiction has been decried with unusual
vehemence . . . [and i]t is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be
dragged before a court.” Id. at 717–18.
99
See generally U.S. CONST. art. III.
100
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 420 (1793).
101
See id. at 451 (opinion of Blair, J.); id. at 466 (opinion of Wilson, J.); id. at
469 (opinion of Cushing, J.); id. at 479 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). More specifically, in
issuing his opinion, Chief Justice Jay made clear that the Constitution explicitly
authorized suits between states and citizens of other states and that the Framers
could not have intended to only authorize such suits where states were plaintiffs
because this could have easily been expressed. Id. at 476–77.
102
John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power To Create Causes of
Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth
Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1436–37 (1975). In fact, the amendment was
passed by the Senate by a resounding twenty-three to two and by the House of
Representatives by a resounding eighty-one to nine. Id. However, the amendment
was not formally announced as law until 1798, due to a slow adoption by some
states. Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1817, 1893–94 (2010).
103
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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not address whether a state can be sued by one of its own
citizens.104
This latter question was addressed by the Supreme Court
nearly a century after the Eleventh Amendment was ratified in
Hans v. Louisiana.105 Here, a Louisiana citizen tried to sue the
state of Louisiana, claiming the Eleventh Amendment did not
bar his suit because its text only explicitly bars suits from
citizens of different states.106 However, realizing that subjecting
a state to suit by its own citizen and not an out-of-state citizen
would be a “startling and unexpected” result, the Court relied
heavily on Justice Iredell’s Chisholm dissent and the prevailing
views at the time the Constitution was ratified107 to decide that a
state may not be sued by its own citizens.108
Eighteen years after Hans, the Supreme Court expanded on
state immunity in Ex parte Young.109 In this case, stockholders of
several railroad companies sued Minnesota’s attorney general in
his official capacity for enforcing unconstitutional legislation.110
Addressing the issue, the Court held that state officials who
enforce legislation that runs afoul of the Constitution are
amenable to suit for injunctive relief because in doing so “the
officer . . . comes into conflict with the superior authority of th[e]
Constitution” and the “state has no power to impart to [the
official] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme
authority of the United States.”111
Up to this point the Court and Congress had shown that they
view the state sovereign immunity doctrine as having strong preConstitutional roots while simultaneously showing that they
were not afraid to carve out some exceptions when equity
requires relief for individuals.112 Almost seventy years later, the
Court expanded upon Congress’s ability to carve out such

104

See id.
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
106
Id. at 10.
107
See id. at 11–16, 18. The prevailing views at the time the Constitution was
drafted and ratified are the same views that the Court relies on today to form the
basis of state sovereign immunity’s historical origins. See supra notes 98–99 and
accompanying text.
108
Hans, 134 U.S. at 21.
109
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
110
Id. at 129–130.
111
Id. at 159–60 (citing Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887)).
112
See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Hans, 134 U.S. at 21; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
at 159–60.
105
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exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment when it decided
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.113
2.

The Modern Interpretation of State Sovereign Immunity

Fitzpatrick involved amendments to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 that were passed by Congress pursuant to the
The amendments authorized
Fourteenth Amendment.114
individuals to sue states for money damages resulting from
employee discrimination, and a group of retired male state
employees filed such a suit against Connecticut state officials.115
In resolving the case, the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment is “necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions
of [§] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,” since that section calls
for “appropriate legislation” in enforcing the limitations of the
rest of that amendment.116 Thus, Congress had plenary power
within the context of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate
state sovereign immunity.117
Thirteen years later, Fitzpatrick was expanded upon in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., where a plurality of the Court
found that by authorizing Congress to regulate interstate
commerce through the Commerce Clause, the Constitution
implicitly granted Congress the power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity in the pursuit of the regulation of
commerce.118 However, on the very same day, the Court clarified
in Dellmuth v. Muth that the standard of articulation required
for abrogation of state immunity is “unmistakably clear
[intention] in the language of the statute.”119 While the holding
113

427 U.S. 445 (1976).
427 U.S. at 447–48. The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, states that
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment states that
“[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
115
Id. at 448–49.
116
Id. at 456.
117
Id. (“We think that Congress may, in determining what is ‘appropriate
legislation’ for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which are
constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.” (citations omitted)).
118
491 U.S. 1, 18–20 (1989).
119
491 U.S. 223, 227–28 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
114
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in Dellmuth remains the standard, the Union Gas holding was
overruled seven years later in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida.120
Seminole involved the IGRA, enacted pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, which imposed a duty on the states to
negotiate in good faith with tribes to form a gaming compact and
unmistakably authorized tribes to file suit against a state for
breaching that duty.121 In its opinion, the Seminole Court
articulated two questions that must be asked to determine
whether state sovereign immunity has been abrogated by
Congress: “first, whether Congress has ‘unequivocally expresse[d]
its intent to abrogate the immunity’; and second, whether
Congress has acted ‘pursuant to a valid exercise of power.’ ”122
In addressing the first inquiry, the Court determined that
Congress unquestionably intended to abrogate state sovereign
immunity through the IGRA.123 As for the second inquiry, the
Court said that the Act was not passed “pursuant to a valid
exercise of power.”124 While acknowledging that Union Gas
unquestionably gave Congress abrogation authority under the
Commerce Clause, the Court nonetheless ruled that Union Gas
had no majority rationale or support from established
jurisprudence
and
improperly
expanded
Article
III’s
jurisdictional scope.125 As a result, the Court expressly overruled
Union Gas and held that state sovereign immunity was not
validly abrogated under the IGRA.126
Regarding Seminole, it is important to note that the Court
acknowledged (1) the deep historical roots and principles of

120
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (“We feel bound to
conclude that Union Gas was wrongly decided and that it should be, and now is,
overruled.”).
121
Id. at 47.
122
Id. at 55 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
123
Id. at 57.
124
Id. at 58, 76.
125
Id. at 62–65.
126
Id. at 66, 76. Additionally, the Court addressed the alternative argument
that the Florida Governor may be subjected to the suit through the Ex parte Young
exception. Id. at 73. Ultimately, the Court held that Ex parte Young was inapplicable
because (1) the IGRA provided a remedial scheme outside of subjecting a state to
suit so courts “should hesitate before . . . permitting an action against a state officer
based upon Ex parte Young,” and (2) “the fact that Congress chose to impose upon
the State a liability that is significantly more limited than would be the liability
imposed upon the state officer under Ex parte Young strongly indicates that
Congress had no wish to create the latter under [the IGRA].” Id. at 74–76.

252

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:233

sovereignty that are embodied in the Eleventh Amendment;127
(2) the continued existence of the Ex parte Young exception;128
(3) the importance of the “unmistakably clear” intention
standard;129 and (4) the continuing validity of Congress’s
Fourteenth Amendment abrogation power that was indicated in
Fitzpatrick.130 However, the Court was not finished clarifying
congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity, as it
addressed the issue a mere three years later in Alden v. Maine.131
Alden involved state probation officers filing a suit against
the state of Maine for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”), which authorized private suits against non-consenting
states in their own courts.132 However, the Court held that such
authorization was unconstitutional because Article I of the
Constitution prohibits Congress from subjecting non-consenting
states to suits in their own courts.133
In reaching this holding, the Court reasoned that state
sovereign immunity is not derived from, or limited by, the
Eleventh Amendment, as it is a “fundamental aspect of the
sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of
the Constitution, and which they retain today . . . except as
altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional
Amendments.”134 Ultimately, the Court thought it would be
127
Id. at 54 (“[E]ach State is a sovereign entity in our federal system;
and . . . ‘[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of
an individual without its consent’ [and f]or over a century we have reaffirmed that
federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States ‘was not contemplated by
the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States.’ ”
(quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13, 15 (1890)).
128
See id. at 73–76.
129
Id. at 55–56.
130
Id. at 65–66.
131
527 U.S. 706 (1999).
132
Id. at 711–12.
133
Id. at 712.
134
Id. at 712–13. The Court went as far as to say that despite commonly
referring to state sovereign immunity as “Eleventh Amendment immunity,” this is
actually a convenient shorthand phrase that does not encapsulate the whole origin
of the doctrine. Id. Rather, despite the explicit text of the amendment which
would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the
federal courts, “[the Court] ha[s] understood the Eleventh Amendment to
stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it
confirms.” That presupposition, first observed over a century ago in Hans v.
Louisiana, has two parts: first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our
federal system; and second, that “[i]t is inherent in the nature of
sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
consent.”
Id. at 729 (ellipsis in original) (citations omitted).
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anomalous for states to be subjected to suit in their own court
while being shielded from suit in federal court and supported this
view by looking to “the Constitution’s structure, its history, and
the [Court’s] authoritative interpretations.”135
Sticking with a narrow scope in which Congress is
authorized to abrogate state sovereign immunity, the Court
decided Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board
v. College Savings Bank on the same day as Alden.136 The
Florida Prepaid case centered around the Patent and Plant
Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (“Patent Remedy
Act”), which was enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment § 5, and abrogated state sovereign immunity in
patent infringement and plant variety protection suits.137 The
goal of the act was to allow infringed upon patent owners to seek
redress from patent infringing states by preventing states from
claiming sovereign immunity in infringement suits.138
In
evaluating whether the act validly abrogated state immunity, the
Court analyzed the two-step inquiry articulated in Seminole and
determined that, under the first step, “Congress’ intent to
abrogate could not have been any clearer.”139 However, Congress
failed under the second step because it did not act pursuant to a
valid exercise of power.140
Although patent rights have long been held a form of
property141 and the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from
depriving people of property without due process of law,142 the
Court in Florida Prepaid nonetheless held that the Patent
Remedy Act was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment § 5.143
Applying a recently established standard for Fourteenth
Amendment legislation,144 the Court deemed that since the Act
did not “identify[] . . . [its] targeted constitutional wrong or
135

Id. at 713, 743, 752–53.
527 U.S. 627 (1999).
137
Id. at 630–32.
138
Id. at 641–42.
139
Id. at 635.
140
Id. at 647.
141
Id. at 637.
142
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
143
527 U.S. at 647.
144
The standard for Fourteenth Amendment legislation was set forth in City of
Boerne v. Flores, wherein the Court held that legislation enacted pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5, requires “congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”
521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
136
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evil,”145 its means—that is, abrogation of state immunity in all
infringement suits—were too broad in proportion to the end it
was trying to reach—that is, provide recourse for infringed upon
patent owners.146 As a result, the Patent Remedy Act was
deemed unconstitutional and the state was immune from suit.147
Three years after Florida Prepaid, the Court was faced with
an issue of first impression in Federal Maritime Commission v.
South Carolina State Ports Authority (“FMC”): whether state
sovereign immunity applies to agency proceedings.148 In deciding
the case, the Court set forth the framework for determining
whether state sovereign immunity applies in administrative
proceedings. The Court stated: “we must examine [Federal
Maritime Commission (“FMC”)] adjudications to determine
whether they are the type of proceedings from which the Framers
would have thought the States possessed immunity when they
agreed to enter the Union” and then proceeded to compare the
characteristics of FMC administrative adjudications to those of
civil litigation.149 In applying this standard, the Court held that
although the FMC is an Article II administrative agency, “the
similarities between FMC proceedings and civil litigation are
overwhelming,” making it hard to “imagine that [the Framers]
145
Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646. After reciting City of Boerne’s holding, the
Florida Prepaid Court stated that City of Boerne requires Congress to both “identify
conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive provisions,
and . . . tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct.” Id. at
639. The Court specifically noted that the deprivation of a protected interest by the
state is not unconstitutional on its own, but rather the “deprivation of such an
interest without due process of law” is what is unconstitutional. Id. at 643 (quoting
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)). Based on this, the Court went on to
say that it is not patent infringement by the state that is unconstitutional, it is
patent infringement without provision of a remedy. Id. (citations omitted). Since
Congress did not address potential state remedies that were available, did not focus
on specific types of infringement, and did not provide anything in the legislative
record to indicate that using sovereign immunity to avoid infringement suits was
widespread, the act was deemed unconstitutional. Id. at 643, 645–47.
146
Id. at 646 (“[T]he provisions of the Patent Remedy Act are ‘so out of
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that [they] cannot be
understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.’ An
unlimited range of state conduct would expose a State to claims of direct, induced, or
contributory patent infringement . . . .”) (citation omitted).
147
Id. at 647–48.
148
535 U.S. 743, 747 (2002). This case involved a cruise ship company that filed
a complaint against the South Carolina State Ports Authority with the Federal
Maritime Commission (“FMC”) for violating the Shipping Act of 1984. Id. at 747–48.
The FMC is an administrative agency whose authority falls under the executive
branch. Id. at 750.
149
Id. at 756–59.
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would have found it acceptable” to subject states to litigationesque agency proceedings initiated by a private complaint such
as FMC adjudications.150 As a result, state sovereign immunity
protected the state from FMC proceedings.151
Ten years after FMC, the Court clarified the standard
required to abrogate under the Fourteenth Amendment § 5, in
Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland.152 In Coleman, a male
employed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland filed suit against
the court for violating the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(“FMLA”).153 The FMLA provided that employees could take up
to twelve weeks of unpaid leave each year under certain
circumstances, and it provided a right to file suit “against any
employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State
court of competent jurisdiction.”154
When the petitioner filed suit, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland claimed state sovereign immunity, so the Court had to
apply the proportional and congruent test from City of Boerne v.
Flores.155 In applying the test, the Court concluded that while
the FMLA sought to remedy sexual discrimination, there was no
evidence to support that states had a pattern of discriminating
against employees in the application of their medical leave
policies, which rendered abrogation of state immunity too broad
of a solution.156 For abrogation to be valid under the Fourteenth
Amendment § 5, “Congress must identify a pattern of
constitutional violations and tailor a remedy congruent and
proportional to the documented violations.”157
This exploration of the historical origins and development of
the state sovereign immunity doctrine reveals several
discernable principles. The doctrine comes from the idea of
sovereign immunity that shielded the King from suit in England,
150
Id. at 757–60. However, the Court did explicitly note that the FMC could
“institute its own administrative proceeding against a state-run port” for Shipping
Act violations. Id. at 768. Thus, even though the similarities between FMC
proceedings and civil litigation played a part in the Court’s holding, the holding
seems to actually rest on the fact that when a complaint is filed with the FMC by a
private party, the FMC “does not even have the discretion to refuse to adjudicate
[it].” Id. at 764 (citation omitted).
151
Id. at 769.
152
566 U.S. 30 (2012).
153
Id. at 33–35.
154
Id. at 34.
155
Id. at 36; see also supra note 144.
156
Coleman, 566 U.S. at 37–38, 43.
157
Id. at 43.
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and, while the extent of colonial adoption of the doctrine is
unclear, it was definitely acknowledged by many during the
Constitution’s ratification process.158 Nonetheless, it was not
explicitly accounted for in the Constitution and as a result of
several controversies that addressed this constitutional silence,
the doctrine now rests upon a combination of the Eleventh
Amendment, the Constitution’s structure, and the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of pre-constitutional common law and
traditions.159 As a result, the Court has made clear that the
primary purpose of state sovereign immunity is “to accord States
the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign
entities.”160
C.

Tribal Sovereign Immunity and State Sovereign Immunity
Are Functionally the Same

Based on the deep historical dives into tribal and state
sovereign immunity, it may initially appear that state sovereign
immunity is clearly the stronger legal doctrine, due to its more
robust constitutional roots.
However, there are principles
common to the two doctrines that actually place them on
relatively equal footing.161
For starters, the two doctrines are strikingly similar to each
other. As noted above, both doctrines predate the ratification of
the Constitution.162 This is noteworthy because with state
sovereign immunity in particular, the Supreme Court has
emphasized the fact that a state’s immunity is not derived solely
from the Constitution, but rather from “common-law tradition,”
which is embodied today by the Constitution.163 Because tribal

158

See supra Section I.B.1.
See supra Section I.B.
160
Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (citing
In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)).
161
In fact, it has been suggested that tribal sovereign immunity actually has a
broader reach than state sovereign immunity since tribes cannot be sued by a state,
but a state can be sued by another state. See William Wood, It Wasn’t an Accident:
The Tribal Sovereign Immunity Story, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1666 (2013) (“Tribal
immunity is in certain respects broader than other governments’ immunities . . . .”);
Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 765 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (posing the question: “Why should an Indian tribe enjoy broader
immunity than the States, the Federal Government, and foreign nations?” when
discussing the “anomalous” results of the majority’s holding in comparison to the
other sovereign immunity doctrines).
162
See supra Sections I.A–B.
163
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712–13, 733 (1999).
159
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sovereign immunity also derives from common law,164 and certain
principles of tribal sovereignty are embodied in the
Constitution,165 the Supreme Court’s emphasis on state
immunity’s common-law origins places the two doctrines on
similar footing in terms of how the two originated.
Moreover, tribal immunity protects tribes from suits brought
by states, and state immunity protects states from suits brought
by tribes.166 Another similarity is that both doctrines extend to
officers in their official capacities—except for when Ex parte
Young applies.167 While these two similarities may seem minor,
they are key in illustrating the equivalence of these two
doctrines. The fact that states and tribes are reciprocally
immune from suits from each other illustrates that the United
States does not favor one sovereignty over the other. The
immunity of tribal and state officers emphasizes this point
further because it recognizes the fact that government officers
are vital to maintaining self-government, which is an important
aspect of sovereignty.168 By according both tribal and state
officers immunity, United States law and policy illustrate that
the self-government—and thus the sovereignty—of both tribes
and states are valued.
On the other hand, the differences between the two doctrines
are insignificant when placed under a microscope. One main
point that scholars have brought up to distinguish state
sovereign immunity from tribal sovereign immunity is the fact
that Congress has plenary power to abrogate tribal immunity,
while up to this point Congress has only been permitted to
abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the limitations of

164

See, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold
Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986).
165
See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
166
Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (“We have
repeatedly held that Indian tribes enjoy immunity against suits by States, as it
would be absurd to suggest that the tribes surrendered immunity in a convention to
which they were not even parties. But if the convention could not surrender the
tribes’ immunity for the benefit of the States, we do not believe that it surrendered
the States’ immunity for the benefit of the tribes.” (citation omitted)).
167
See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908); Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11
How.) 362, 374 (1850).
168
See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 757 (1998)
(indicating that Congress has not abrogated tribal sovereign immunity because it
wanted to promote tribal self-sufficiency (citing Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 510 (1991)).
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the Fourteenth Amendment § 5.169 Although this is a valid point,
so long as Congress enacts “ ‘appropriate’ legislation” that is
proportional and congruent, and addresses an area that is
covered by the Fourteenth Amendment, it may abrogate state
sovereign immunity.170 And, as we have seen in the past,
Congress can masterfully enact legislation that is arguably
somewhat attenuated from the enumerated power under which it
was passed.171
More to the point, and relevant for present purposes,
Congress apparently has the ability to abrogate state sovereign
immunity with regard to certain types of patent infringement—
direct, incidental, contributory—which can impact inter partes
review proceedings.172 As stated in Florida Prepaid and recently
reconfirmed by the Supreme Court, patent rights are property.173
Because they are property, if the state infringes on an
individual’s patent and then tries to avoid an infringement suit
by claiming sovereign immunity, the patent owner would be
deprived of his or her property without due process of law.174
This would violate the Fourteenth Amendment § 1, which in turn
would allow Congress to pass “appropriate legislation” under § 5
169

See Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity’s Penumbras: Common Law,
“Accident,” and Policy in the Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 765, 783 (2008) (pointing out that the main difference between state
and tribal sovereign immunity is that tribal immunity can be abrogated by Congress
at will, while state sovereign immunity cannot); Jeff M. Kosseff, Sovereignty for
Profits: Courts’ Expansion of Sovereign Immunity to Tribe-Owned Businesses, 5 FLA.
A&M U. L. REV. 131, 148 (2009) (noting that Congress is very limited in its ability to
abrogate state sovereign immunity, but it does not have the same limitations in its
ability to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity); Gregory Ablavsky, Tribal Sovereign
Immunity and Patent Law, STAN. L. SCH.: LEGAL AGGREGATE (Sept. 13, 2017),
https://law.stanford.edu/2017/09/13/tribal-sovereign-immunity-and-patent-law/.
170
See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 637–38 (1999).
171
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which aimed to prohibit
discrimination, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, and, in doing so, it conveniently
construed the words of the Commerce Clause to interrelate discrimination and
interstate commerce so that the act could pass constitutional muster. See Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964).
172
See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646–48 (implying that had Congress narrowed
the coverage of the Patent Remedy Act it would have been valid legislation enacted
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5).
173
See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct.
1365, 1379 (2018) (“[O]ur decision should not be misconstrued as suggesting that
patents are not property for purposes of the Due Process Clause or the Takings
Clause.” (citations omitted)); Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642 (“Patents, however, have
long been considered a species of property.” (citations omitted)).
174
See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 637, 642–643.
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of that Amendment.175 Thus, within the ambit of this Note, both
doctrines are vulnerable to congressional abrogation.
Regardless, while there are concededly many fewer
restrictions on Congress’s power to abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity than with respect to state sovereign immunity, the
most important point to note in this analysis is that Congress has
only abrogated tribal immunity in the limited context of certain
classes of suits, and, as a whole, the tribal sovereign immunity
doctrine has mostly been left undisturbed by Congress.176 Thus,
the argument that Congress could abrogate tribal immunity
more easily fails because, until Congress acts, the argument is
mere conjecture. Moreover, even if Congress were to absolutely
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, the standard of articulation
would be the same for tribes as it is for states: clear and
unequivocal expression of intent.177
One more key difference that is hard to ignore is that while
states are amenable to suits filed by other states, they may not
sue tribes.178 This is because upon discussion at the ratifying
conventions, states agreed to waive their immunity against each
other upon entering the union; tribes on the other hand were not
175

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5; see also Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642, 646–
48 (noting that there is “no reason why Congress might not legislate
against . . . deprivation [of patent rights] without due process under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment” and indicating that the Patent Remedy Act would have
been valid had it been more narrowly tailored).
176
Gregory J. Wong, Intent Matters: Assessing Sovereign Immunity for Tribal
Entities, 82 WASH. L. REV. 205, 211–12 (2007) (“Although Congress may waive tribal
sovereign immunity, it has only chosen to do so in limited classes of suits. For
example, Congress has chosen to expose tribes to suit in the areas of mandatory
liability insurance and gaming activities.”).
177
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 790 (2014) (“[T]o
abrogate [tribal] immunity, Congress must ‘unequivocally’ express that purpose.”
(quoting C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S.
411, 418 (2001)); Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 285 (2011) (stating that “our
precedents require” unequivocal expression to subject states to suit).
178
See supra note 161. While the tribal sovereign immunity cases that have
been analyzed in this Note have not addressed whether Native American tribes may
sue other Native American tribes in federal court, the likely presumption is that
they cannot since “federally recognized tribes are immune from suit by any entity or
individual, other than the United States, absent their consent or congressional
abrogation” and different tribes are considered separate entities from one another.
Clay Smith, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: A Primer, ADVOC. (IDAHO), May 2007, at 19,
19; see also Bart J. Freedman et al., Exploring Tribal Sovereign Immunity with
Lewis v. Clarke, K&L GATES: LEGAL INSIGHT (May 11, 2017),
http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/f5f67b54-b13d-4b18-98d57f1bd6d9e444/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6eca24af-4d39-4590-9beb955c60394f65/ExploringIndian_Law(North%20America)Alert_05092017.pdf.
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privy to the ratifying conventions and thus “it would be absurd to
suggest that the tribes surrendered immunity [from suits
brought by states] in a convention to which they were not even
parties.”179 This is the only area in which one doctrine trumps
the other, and the result of this difference is that tribal sovereign
immunity actually has a somewhat broader reach than the state
doctrine.180
Nonetheless, the two doctrines serve the same purpose with
regard to their respective sovereigns. While the Supreme Court
has explicitly stated that the primary purpose of state sovereign
immunity is “to accord States the dignity that is consistent with
their status as sovereign entities,”181 this principle is implicit for
tribal immunity. Within that statement by the Court is an
implication that there is a certain level of dignity that all
sovereign entities deserve.
Additionally, Alexander Hamilton stated in The Federalist
No. 81 that “[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual WITHOUT ITS
CONSENT.”182 Moreover, the Supreme Court has explicitly
stated that “Indian tribes . . . exercise ‘inherent sovereign
authority’ ” and “[a]mong the core aspects of sovereignty that
tribes possess . . . is the ‘common-law immunity from suit
traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.’ ”183 Thus, it is implied
that the primary purpose of tribal sovereign immunity is to
accord tribes “the dignity that is consistent with their status as
sovereign entities.”184 As a result, it can be said that despite
somewhat different historical roots, tribal and state sovereign
immunity serve the same purpose and are functionally the same,
with the tribal version having a slightly broader reach than the
state version.
179

Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991).
See supra note 161.
181
Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (citing
In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)).
182
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
183
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788 (2014) (first quoting
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505,
509 (1991); then quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)).
184
Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 760 (citing In re Ayers, 123 U.S. at 505). To
bring this argument full circle, as mentioned earlier, the original recognition of
tribal sovereignty came from Francisco de Victoria’s view that tribes deserved to be
treated with the respect that sovereign nations deserved, which was widely
embraced and eventually adopted by the Supreme Court. See supra notes 23–24, 27
and accompanying text.
180
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II. THE PATENT SYSTEM, THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT AND
INTER PARTES REVIEW
A.

Historical Overview and Purpose of the Patent System

The recognition of patents as an essential tool of society has
existed since before the United States was founded.185 In fact,
the first known patent system was established in Venice through
the Venetian Senate’s 1474 Act.186 Eventually, the idea of the
patent system spread throughout Europe and in due course was
introduced to the American colonies.187
Upon declaring independence, the colonists recognized the
importance of having a national patent system.188 As such, the
Framers provided for an American patent system in the United
States Constitution.189 The Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution states, “The Congress shall have Power . . . To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”190 The plain
words of this clause state the purpose of having a patent
system.191 That is, the patent system is formed for the purpose of
stimulating individuals to make advancements in science and the
arts so that society can benefit from the new knowledge and
processes that are created.192
As the utilitarian theory suggests, “absent patent protection
inventors will not have sufficient incentive to invest in creating,
developing, and marketing new products.”193 The patent system
is created to provide patent protection for a limited time period194

185
See 1 PETER S. MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2018, at 156 (2018).
186
Id.
187
Id. at 156–57.
188
Id. at 157.
189
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
190
Id.
191
See Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External
Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J. 1329, 1339–40 (2012) (discussing the purpose of the
Intellectual Property Clause and stating that the “natural reading of this
clause . . . is that Congress has the power to promote the progress of science and
useful arts using solely the specified means”—that is, by giving authors and
inventors the exclusive rights to their works for a limited time).
192
See 1 MENELL ET AL., supra note 185, at 167.
193
Id.
194
In the United States, patents are protected for twenty years from the date
the patent application was filed. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2018).
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to motivate inventors to come up with innovative new products
and processes that are revealed to the public to benefit society.195
In essence, the patent system provides for a quid pro quo
between inventors and society as a whole: the inventor gets a
limited monopoly over his or her invention and society reaps the
benefits that come from disclosure of the invention’s
advancements.196
When an invention is patented, the patent is then considered
the inventor’s property,197 but the rights that come along with
As
that property are unlike most forms of property.198
mentioned, patent rights are limited in time. In addition,
patents only give the patent holder, or “patentee,” the right to
exclude others from using the patented device, and, therefore, it
is often described as a negative right.199
Because of the
exclusionary nature of patents, there are stringent requirements
that must be met to get an invention patented.200
As designated in the Constitution, the power to set these
requirements rests solely in the hands of Congress.201 Over the
years, Congress has passed various major acts to govern and to
ensure the efficiency of the patent system.202 The very first
patent statute was passed by Congress in 1790, but due to issues
with administrative efficiency and a high bar for inventors, the
act was quickly superseded three years later by the Patent Act of
195

See 1 MENELL ET AL., supra note 185, at 167.
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“The basic quid pro quo
contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly
is the benefit derived by the public from an invention . . . .”); see also Andersen,
supra note 62, at 333 (“The ‘essential tension,’ of the U.S. patent system is that it is
designed to encourage the societal benefit of innovation by dolling [sic] out the
individual reward of exclusive rights to an invention.”); Bruce Day & Mike
Martinez, The Roots of Intellectual Property: Trade Secrets, Patents, Trademarks
and Copyrights, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Jan. 1993, at 30, 32 (“The quid pro quo for this
right is that the patentee must make a full disclosure of the inventions to the public
so that the public will be able to practice or use the invention when the patent
expires.”).
197
See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct.
1365, 1379 (2018); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999).
198
Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 321, 322 (2009).
199
Id.
200
See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); Day &
Martinez, supra note 196, at 33; Karl F. Jorda, Patent and Trade Secret
Complementariness: An Unsuspected Synergy, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 25 (2008).
201
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
202
See 1 MENELL ET AL., supra note 185, at 157–60.
196
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1793.203 The 1793 Act switched the patent system from an
examination system, whereby patent examiners examined
inventions before the initial patent grant, to a registration
system, whereby inventors obtained patents by merely
registering their inventions—but the validity of such patents was
then left to the mercy of the federal courts’ interpretation of the
1793 statute to determine validity when the patents were
challenged.204
Although the 1793 Act resulted in some useful
interpretations by jurists,205 the exclusive reliance on courts to
determine patent validity led to uncertainty in the patent
realm206 and caused people to lose faith in the patent system.207
As a result, Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1836, which
switched the American patent system back to an examination
system.208 However, this time around the examination system
incorporated full-time professional examiners, which helped to
avoid the administrative inefficiency that was suffered under the
1790 Act.209
Under the 1836 Act, the patent system grew exponentially
and there were many important developments in the system
through the common law.210 But eventually, that growth and
development slowed due to a widespread distrust of big business
and monopolies,211 which resulted in an “anti-patent bias on the
Supreme Court.”212 Such bias caused the Court to require a high
bar for patentability and led Congress to enact the Patent Act of
1952.213
The Patent Act of 1952 took a fair amount of discretion away
from the courts by codifying specific standards to allow for
consistency within the patent system.214 For example, the 1952
203

Id. at 157–58.
Andrew P. Morriss & Craig Allen Nard, Institutional Choice & Interest
Groups in the Development of American Patent Law: 1790–1865, 19 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 143, 151–52 (2011).
205
See 1 MENELL ET AL., supra note 185, at 158–59.
206
See Morris & Nard, supra note 204, at 151.
207
See 1 MENELL ET AL., supra note 185, at 159.
208
Id.
209
Id.; see also Morriss & Nard, supra note 204, at 160 (discussing additional
changes to the patent system following the enactment of the 1836 Act).
210
See 1 MENELL ET AL., supra note 185, at 159; Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms
and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 69–70 (2010).
211
1 MENELL ET AL., supra note 185, at 160.
212
Nard, supra note 210, at 72.
213
See id. at 72–73.
214
See id.
204
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Act specifically set forward the requirements that are to be met
in order for an invention to be patentable: (1) subject matter,215
(3) novelty,217
(4) nonobviousness,218
and
(2) utility,216
219
Additionally, the act codified the standard for
(5) disclosure.
patent infringement,220 which ironically had been left up to the
courts up to that point.221 And while a full description of all of
the 1952 Act’s provisions is outside the scope of this Note, it is
worth mentioning that certain provisions of the Act still serve as
the foundation of the current patent system despite a more
recent enactment by Congress.222
Before touching upon the most recent congressional
enactment in patent law, however, it is pertinent to the
background of this Note to mention the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982.223 The Federal Courts Improvement
Act of 1982 was enacted by Congress to create the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for the purpose of
unifying the nation’s laws in certain areas of practice, one of
which was patent law.224 In creating the Federal Circuit, the act
merged the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
with the appellate division of the United States Court of Claims
and vested exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals in the
Federal Circuit.225
B.

The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act and Inter Partes
Review

More recently, Congress has passed the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act (“America Invents Act” or “AIA”).226 The
215

See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
Id.
217
Id. § 102(a).
218
Id. § 103.
219
Id. § 112(a)–(b).
220
See id. § 271.
221
See Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952,
35 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 476, 476–77 (1953).
222
See 1 MENELL ET AL., supra note 185, at 169.
223
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
224
See 1 MENELL ET AL., supra note 185, at 160; Richard H. Seamon, The
Provenance of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
543, 577–78 (2003).
225
Court Jurisdiction, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.
uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction (last visited July 7, 2019).
226
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
216
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AIA’s legislative history indicates that its purpose is “to ensure
that the patent system in the 21st century reflects the
constitutional imperative. . . . The legislation is designed to
establish a more efficient and streamlined patent system that
will improve patent quality and limit unnecessary and
counterproductive litigation costs.”227 Additionally, the Act has
shifted the American patent system more in line with the
systems of other nations, which has assisted in harmonizing
international patent law.228
In carrying out its purpose, the AIA implemented various
features that were new to American patent law. The most
prominent of these new provisions is the updated wording of
35 U.S.C. § 102, which changes the patent system from a first-toinvent system toward more of a first-to-file system.229 Essentially
this has made it so the first person to file a valid patent
application for an invention is granted the patent rights, with a
few important exceptions, whereas the old system aimed to give
the patent to the first person to actually invent the invention,
regardless of who filed first.230
Among the many other changes that the AIA made to the
patent system was the introduction of a new form of agency-level
post-grant review proceeding, the inter partes review.231 IPRs
consist of a proceeding that is instituted by the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board232 upon petition by a third party and a finding that
“there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail
with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the
petition.”233 If instituted, the PTAB reviews the “patentability of
227

H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011).
Albert Tramposch, The Global Impact of the America Invents Act, WIPO
MAG., Dec. 2011, at 6, 6, http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/wipo_magazine/
en/pdf/2011/wipo_pub_121_2011_06.pdf.
229
See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018); Susanne Hollinger, The America Invents Act—
Overview and Implications, ACS MED. CHEMISTRY LETTERS, Feb. 21, 2012, at 174,
174; Jing Wang et al., Comparison of United States AIA First-Inventor-to-File with
Chinese First-to-File, 38 U. DAYTON L. REV. 251, 253 (2013).
230
See Wang et al., supra note 229, at 252–53; Hollinger, supra note 229. The
distinctions between the first-to-file and the first-to-invent systems are not relevant
to this Note, but it is worth briefly mentioning the change as a key aspect of the AIA
for the purpose of giving the reader an overview of patent law.
231
See 35 U.S.C. § 311; see also Aashish Kapadia, Inter Partes Review: A New
Paradigm in Patent Litigation, 23 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 113, 114–15 (2015)
(explaining the AIA’s introduction of IPRs to replace IPXs).
232
The PTAB was established by the America Invents Act and codified in Title
35 of the United States Code. See 35 U.S.C. § 6.
233
Id. § 314(a).
228
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one of more claims in [the challenged] patent only on a ground
that could be raised under §§ 102 or 103, and only on the basis of
prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.”234
While considered a new form of post-grant proceeding, IPR
proceedings are a reformed version of the now defunct inter
partes reexamination (“IPX”) proceeding.235
Like IPR
proceedings, IPX proceedings allowed third parties to request the
USPTO to reexamine the validity of issued patents.236 However,
the standard for instituting a proceeding was lower for IPXs than
they are for IPRs.237 Additionally, IPXs had no timetable for
resolution,238 whereas IPRs must be resolved within one year of
instituting the review.239 And while there are several other
discrepancies between the two proceedings, it is enough for
present purposes to point out that the IPR was created to
alleviate clear inadequacies of the IPX and to provide more
efficient means of challenging patents and avoiding litigation.240
Indeed, the USPTO requires an efficient safeguard for its
patent-issuing process, as it currently receives over 600,000
patent applications per year.241 As a result of such a high
234
Inter Partes Review, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/
patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/inter-partes-review
(last visited July 13, 2019); see also 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (providing petitioners the
ability to challenge patent claims based on Section 102 or 103 grounds).
235
See Paul R. Gugliuzza, (In)Valid Patents, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 281–
82 (2016); Kapadia, supra note 231, at 115; Jason Kornmehl, Ericsson, Inc. v.
Regents of the University of Minnesota and a New Frontier for the Waiver by
Litigation Conduct Doctrine, 2018 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 5 (2018).
236
MATTHEW A. SMITH, INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION 11 (1E ed. 2009),
https://www.ipo.org//wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Inter_Partes_Reexamination.pdf
(last visited Jul. 13, 2019).
237
See Kapadia, supra note 231, at 118 (“The original IPX proceeding had a
lower standard . . . where ‘a substantial new question of patentability’ [was]
required.”). Compare SMITH, supra note 236, at 12 (“The Examiner decides whether
the request raises a ‘substantial new question of patentability’, [sic] and if so, begins
an inter partes reexamination proceeding.”), with 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (“The Director
may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless . . . there is a
reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of
the claims challenged in the petition.”).
238
See Kapadia, supra note 231, at 116.
239
35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11).
240
See Kapadia, supra note 231, at 115; Joel Sayres & Julie Wahlstrand, To
Stay or Not to Stay Pending IPR? That Should Be A Simpler Question, CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. | PTAB B. ASS’N., Apr. 2018, at 52, 52 n.2 (quoting various
congressional reports to illustrate the deficiencies of IPX and the purpose of adding
the IPR).
241
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT 179 tbl.2 (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
USPTOFY18PAR.pdf.
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demand, examiners at the Patent Office face unrealistic
pressures to make a decision on each patent application, which
leads to erroneous patent grants and can ultimately undermine
the integrity of the patent system.242 Thus, IPR proceedings act
as a backstop for erroneously issued patents by allowing the
PTAB to take a closer second look at patents243 and letting the
public know that they can trust the USPTO and have confidence
in the patent system.244
C.

Oil States: The Constitutionality of Inter Partes Review

Despite the efficiency and safeguarding functions that IPR
proceedings are intended to provide for the USPTO, IPRs have
been challenged on constitutional grounds several times since
they replaced IPX proceedings.245 The most recent challenge
came in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy
Group, LLC, where the petitioner, Oil States, argued that IPRs
run afoul of Article III of the Constitution.246
In relevant part,247 Oil States argued that: (1) patent rights
are private property rights, as opposed to public rights under the
public-rights doctrine, and thus mandate resolution in an Article
III court;248 (2) IPRs “violate[] the ‘general’ principle that
‘Congress may not “withdraw from judicial cognizance any
matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the
common law, or in equity, or admiralty” ’ ” since English courts
heard patent validity challenges at common law during the
eighteenth century;249 and (3) IPRs violate Article III because
they share “every salient characteristic associated with the
exercise of the judicial power.”250

242
Mylan II, 896 F.3d 1322, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Dyk, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019).
243
The second time around usually affords examiners the opportunity to look at
prior art that was “not known or available to the PTO” at the time of the initial
examination. Id. at 1331.
244
Id. at 1332–33.
245
See generally Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC,
138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018); MCM Portfiolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
246
138 S. Ct. at 1372.
247
Oil States made an argument that IPRs violate the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury, but this argument is irrelevant to this Note and the Court was
unpersuaded by this argument. Id. at 1379.
248
Id. at 1375–76.
249
Id. at 1376 (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484 (2011)).
250
Id. at 1378.
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In response to Oil States’ first argument, the Supreme Court
held that patent grants are “a matter involving public rights” and
thus IPRs fall “squarely within the public-rights doctrine.”251 The
Court reasoned that when the government grants patents, it
takes valuable information from the public and gives it to the
inventor to the exclusion of everybody else; thus, it is a matter
“between ‘the public . . . and . . . the patentee.’ ”252
The
Constitution sanctions patent grants, and IPRs merely involve
retracing the steps of granting the patent to ensure an efficient
patent system.253 The Court then went on to state that because
patents are granted subject to reexamination by the PTO, and
such a qualification is authorized for public rights “franchises,”
the public-rights doctrine covers matters for inter partes
review.254
The Court then addressed Oil States’ second argument
regarding the English common law.255 Ultimately, the Court
determined that patent validity is not a matter that “from its
nature” requires resolution by a court because although this was
common under English law, England also had other methods of
resolving these matters that resembled IPR.256 This reasoning
illustrates that conditioning patent grants on the ability to
reexamine them at a later time was not unusual, even if
adjudication was the traditional method of resolution.257
Finally, in addressing Oil States’ comparison of IPRs to
litigation, the Court noted that (1) it “has never adopted a ‘looks
like’ test” to decide whether Article III has been violated,
(2) “[t]he fact that an agency uses court-like procedures does not
necessarily mean it is exercising the judicial power,” and
(3) “[a]lthough inter partes review includes some of the features
of adversarial litigation,” it is not binding on the parties involved
as to ultimate infringement liability.258 As such, the Court held
that IPRs are constitutional as they remain a public-rights
matter and do not require a judicial determination by an
251

Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1373–74 (second elipsis in original) (quoting United States v. Duell,
172 U.S. 576, 586 (1899)).
253
Id. at 1374–75.
254
Id.
255
See id. at 1376–78.
256
Id. at 1376–77 (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484 (2011)).
257
Id. at 1377–78.
258
Id. at 1378 (first citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991); then
citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)).
252
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Article III court.259 In practical terms, this holding means that
patent holders will continue to find innovative ways to avoid IPR
proceedings.
III. THE INTRA-CIRCUIT SPLIT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
AND THE PTAB
Indeed, since the inception of inter partes review proceedings
there have been various instances of patentees attempting to
avoid the proceedings.260 While some of these instances have
been unsuccessful for patentees,261 there have also been several
instances of patentee success.262 In particular, the PTAB has
faced several assertions of sovereign immunity to avoid IPRs,
and it has been inconsistent in how it treats the tribal doctrine
compared to the state version.263 To make matters worse, until
the recent LSI Corp. decision264 the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit had only added to this inconsistency.265 As it
currently stands, this inconsistency has been resolved, but
259

Id.
See id. at 1372 (challenging the constitutionality of IPRs); Mylan II, 896 F.3d
1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (claiming tribal sovereign immunity), cert. denied, 139 S.
Ct. 1547 (2019); MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1285
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (challenging the constitutionality of IPRs); LSI Corp. v. Regents of
the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01068, 2017 WL 6517562, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19,
2017) (claiming state sovereign immunity); Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of
Minn., No. IPR2017-01186, 2017 WL 6517563, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017) (same);
Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-01914, 2017 WL
2992429, at *1 (P.T.A.B. July 13, 2017) (same); NeoChord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., No.
IPR2016-00208, 2017 Pat. App. LEXIS 12969, at *1 (P.T.A.B. May 23, 2017) (same);
Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPR2016-01274, 2017 WL
4015009, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017) (same).
261
See Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379; Mylan II, 896 F.3d at 1329; MCM Portfolio,
812 F.3d at 1292.
262
See NeoChord, 2017 Pat. App. LEXIS 12969, at *31; Covidien, 2017 WL
4015009, at *17.
263
Compare Mylan I, No. IPR2016-01127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *6 (P.T.A.B.
Feb 23, 2018) (holding that tribal sovereign immunity does not apply to IPRs
because, among other things, unlike civil litigation “inter partes review proceeding[s
are] not the type of ‘suit’ to which an Indian tribe would traditionally enjoy
immunity under the common law” (citation omitted)), with Covidien, 2017 WL
4015009, at *11 (holding that state sovereign immunity applies to IPRs because,
among other things, “the considerable resemblance between [inter partes review and
civil litigation] is sufficient to implicate the immunity afforded to the States by the
Eleventh Amendment”).
264
See Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2019).
265
See Mylan II, 896 F.3d at 1327, 1329 (holding that tribal sovereign immunity
does not apply to IPRs because IPRs are “more like an agency enforcement action
than a civil suit”).
260
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should the Supreme Court grant ceriorari and reverse the LSI
Corp. decision, the inconsistency will be revived.266
A.

State Sovereign Immunity at the PTAB

In 2016, Covidien LP filed IPR petitions against three
patents owned by the University of Florida Research Foundation
Inc. (“UFRF”), and, in response, UFRF immediately moved to
dismiss the petitions on the basis of state sovereign immunity.267
In addressing the issue, the PTAB applied the framework set
forward by the Supreme Court in FMC268 that is used to
determine whether sovereign immunity applies to agency
proceedings.269 In doing so, the PTAB reasoned that, among
other things, IPRs are adversarial, are initiated by a third party,
share similar rules and procedures with civil litigation, and have
judges with similar roles to Article III judges.270 As a result of
such similarities, the PTAB held that state sovereign immunity
shields state patent owners from IPR.271
In so holding, the PTAB acknowledged the negative
consequences that could result from shielding state-owned
patents from review but nonetheless held that precluding IPRs
against the states was “precisely the point of the Eleventh
266

LSI Corp., 926 F.3d at 1342; Rizzolo & Tsui, supra note 14.
Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1. UFRF’s basis for claiming state sovereign
immunity is that it is an arm of the state of Florida because it is part of the
University of Florida. Id. at *2.
268
See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 747 (2002); see
also supra notes 148–151 and accompanying text.
269
Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *3–5, *8–11.
270
Id. at *9–10. It is worth noting that the PTAB’s rationale for holding that
state sovereign immunity is allowed as a defense in IPRs in part because IPRs share
similar rules and procedures with civil litigation is seemingly at odds with the
Supreme Court’s rationale in Oil States that the “fact that an agency uses court-like
procedures does not necessarily mean it is exercising the judicial power.” Compare
Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *9–11, with Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v.
Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1378 (2018). To some extent, the
Supreme Court must have recognized this tension as it explicitly stated that its
holding in Oil States was narrow and was only meant to address the
constitutionality of IPRs. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court chose not to address the issue when it denied Allergan and the Saint Regis
Mohawk Tribe’s petition for certiorari, which addressed the issue in the petition, on
April 15, 2019. See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc. (Mylan III), 139
S. Ct. 1547 (2019); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 31, Mylan III, 139 S. Ct. 1547
(No. 18-899).
271
Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *11 (“On the whole, considering the nature of
inter partes review and civil litigation, we conclude that the considerable
resemblance between the two is sufficient to implicate the immunity afforded to the
States by the Eleventh Amendment.”).
267
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Amendment.”272 Further, the board defended its acceptance of
these consequences by stating that Congress did not express
unequivocal intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity.273
Calling on the Supreme Court’s Florida Prepaid rationale that
“Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement by the
States,” the board held that there is no evidence that allowing
state sovereign immunity in IPRs will regularly allow wrongly
issued, state-owned patents to be shielded from review.274
Shortly after the PTAB decided Covidien, it decided
NeoChord, Inc. v. University of Maryland, which involved yet
another assertion of the state sovereign immunity defense in an
IPR.275 While this proceeding was essentially identical to the
Covidien IPR, there were a few minor differences that caused the
PTAB to treat NeoChord as an issue of first impression.276
One difference that the PTAB noted was the different
procedural posture as compared to Covidien. While the sovereign
immunity defense was raised almost immediately in Covidien,
the defense here was not raised until right before an oral hearing
in front of the board.277 This difference was key to NeoChord’s
argument as it claimed that the university implicitly waived its
sovereign immunity by delaying its assertion of the defense and
participating in the proceeding up to that point.278 However, the
PTAB was unconvinced by this argument as it cited to Supreme
Court precedent indicating that state sovereign immunity is a
defense that can be raised at any time.279 NeoChord also argued
that Covidien did not govern this case because the university
licensed out its patent rights to a third party and thus it was a
dispensable party to the proceeding.280 However, this argument
was also unavailing as the university still retained substantive
rights under the license agreement, which made the university

272

Id.
Id.
274
Id. at *12 (quoting Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll.
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640 (1999)).
275
No. IPR2016-00208, 2017 Pat. App. LEXIS 12969, at *3–4 (P.T.A.B. May 23,
2017).
276
See id. at *6.
277
Id. at *21.
278
Id.
279
Id. at *22–23
280
Id. at *29.
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indispensable.281
While these differences between the two
proceedings played a part in the PTAB’s NeoChord holding, the
crux of the PTAB’s holding came in the same form of the FMC
framework with an ultimate determination that IPRs resemble
civil litigation.282 As such, the board once again held that state
sovereign immunity could be asserted to avoid IPR
proceedings.283
Nearly two months later, the PTAB decided Reactive
Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corporation, which once
again involved a state patentee using state sovereign immunity
as an IPR defense.284 This proceeding involved a patent that was
co-owned by both Toyota Motor Corp. and the Regents of the
University of Minnesota (the “Regents”), the latter of which is an
arm of the state of Minnesota.285 Based on the state sovereign
immunity claim by the Regents, the PTAB once again went
through the FMC analysis and held that the similarities between
IPR proceedings and litigation warrant the application of state
sovereign immunity in IPRs.286 As a result, the Regents were
able to avoid the IPR proceeding.287
However, this was not the end of the PTAB’s analysis, as the
patent was co-owned by Toyota, which is a private corporation.288
Since Toyota and the Regents owned equal rights in the patent
and were represented by the same legal counsel, the PTAB
determined that the Regents were not an indispensable party
and the proceeding could continue without the Regents.289 Thus,
state sovereign immunity was successful in shielding the
Regents, but it was not sufficient to shield the patent itself from
the proceeding.290
The next two board decisions, which also involved patents
owned by the Regents, were resolved on the same day and
present an exception to the PTAB’s application of state sovereign
281
Id. at *29–31. This indispensable-party reasoning later became part of the
PTAB’s rationale in Mylan I. See No. IPR2016-01127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *13–15
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018).
282
See NeoChord, 2017 Pat. App. LEXIS 12969, at *5–14.
283
Id. at *31.
284
Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-01914, 2017
WL 2992429, at *1 (P.T.A.B. July 13, 2017).
285
Id. at *1, *5.
286
Id. at *2–3.
287
Id. at *5.
288
See id.
289
Id. at *5–7.
290
Id. at *7.
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immunity.291 These two proceedings, LSI Corp. v. Regents of the
University of Minnesota and Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the
University of Minnesota, were both decided by the same PTAB
judge, Chief Administrative Patent Judge Ruschke, and both
involved waiver of state sovereign immunity.292 Specifically, both
decisions involved the Regents filing an action for patent
infringement and the alleged infringer responding by petitioning
the PTAB for an IPR proceeding for the same patent.293 Because
of the identical procedural postures, the board issued decisions in
both proceedings that are nearly mirror images of each other.294
Although we have seen that state sovereign immunity
applies in IPRs, the board ultimately determined that because
the Regents had filed patent infringement suits for the patents in
question in both proceedings, it had waived its sovereign
immunity from IPRs for those patents.295 In reaching these
holdings, the PTAB reasoned that the key inquiry is whether or
not allowing state sovereign immunity claims would cause
“unfairness and inconsistency” and allow the state to “achieve a
litigation advantage.”296 IPR petitions are similar to compulsory
counterclaims because petitions for IPR of a specific patent must
be filed within one year of an infringement suit.297 Thus,
allowing a state to file an infringement suit, triggering the
statute of limitations for an IPR petition, and then to assert
immunity from the resulting IPR petition would provide the
Regents with an unfair litigation advantage.298 Because such a
result would cause “substantial unfairness and inconsistency,”
the PTAB carved out a waiver exception for state sovereign
immunity in IPRs.299 It is worth noting that on February 13,
2018, the Regents of the University of Minnesota appealed the

291

See generally LSI Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01068,
2017 WL 6517562 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017); Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of
Minn., No. IPR2017-01186, 2017 WL 6517563 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017).
292
See LSI, 2017 WL 6517562, at *1; Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *1.
293
See LSI, 2017 WL 6517562, at *3; Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *3.
294
See generally LSI, 2017 WL 6517562; Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563.
295
See LSI, 2017 WL 6517562, at *4; Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *4.
296
See LSI, 2017 WL 6517562, at *4 (citing Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ.
Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002)); Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *4 (citing
Lapides, 535 U.S. at 620).
297
See LSI, 2017 WL 6517562, at *3; Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *3.
298
See LSI, 2017 WL 6517562, at *3 (citations omitted); Ericsson, 2017 WL
6517563, at *3 (citations omitted).
299
LSI, 2017 WL 6517562, at *4 (citing Lapides, 535 U.S. at 620); Ericsson,
2017 WL 6517563, at *4 (citing Lapides, 535 U.S. at 620).
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PTAB’s LSI and Ericsson decisions to the Federal Circuit.300 The
appeals were consolidated, and on June 14, 2019, the Federal
Circuit held that state sovereign immunity may not be applied in
IPRs and the Regents of the University of Minnesota plans to file
a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.301
B.

Tribal Sovereign Immunity at the PTAB

Despite the PTAB’s continual willingness to declare that
state sovereign immunity applies in IPR proceedings, the board
was highly reluctant to declare the same for tribal sovereign
immunity when it first decided the issue in Mylan I on February
23, 2018.302
1.

The Lead-Up to the PTAB’s Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Decision

In 2015, Allergan Inc., a pharmaceutical company owning
several patents relating to an Allergan product known as
Restasis, which is used to treat “chronic dry eye” symptoms,303
filed suit against Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., and Akorn, Inc. (collectively, “the
Infringers”) for infringing its Restasis patents.304 In response,
Mylan—and, subsequently, Teva and Akorn—petitioned the
PTAB for IPRs against the Restasis patents and the PTAB
instituted the IPR proceedings.305
Allergan countered the board’s decision to institute these
proceedings by entering into a strategic transaction with the
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe (the “Tribe”) several days before the
scheduled oral hearing date for the IPRs.306 As a result of this
300

See Petition for Review/Notice of Appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit by Regents of the University of Minnesota, Regents
of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1559);
Petition for Review / Notice of Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit by Regents of the University of Minnesota, LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1560).
301
LSI Corp., 926 F.3d at 1342; University of Minnesota’s Motion to Stay at 3,
Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (No. 181559).
302
See No. IPR2016-01127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *6 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018)
(citations omitted).
303
Mylan II, 896 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1547
(2019).
304
Id.
305
Id.
306
Mylan I, 2018 WL 1100950, at *1.
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transaction, Allergan transferred its rights in the challenged
Restasis patents and related patent applications to the Tribe,
and the Tribe subsequently licensed the patent rights back to
Allergan.307
The license agreement granted Allergan “an
irrevocable, perpetual, transferrable and exclusive license” to the
patents, and in return, the Tribe received $13.75 million up front
and $15 million annually during the license’s royalty term.308
Furthermore, the assignment and license agreements
specified the rights and obligations of Allergan and the Tribe as
to infringement suits and maintenance of the patents and
included a provision that explicitly provided that the Tribe did
not waive its right to tribal sovereign immunity.309 On the very
same day, the Tribe contacted the PTAB to file a motion to
dismiss the IPRs on the basis of tribal sovereign immunity.310
2.

The PTAB’s Tribal Sovereign Immunity Decision

In deciding whether tribal sovereign immunity applies to
IPRs, the PTAB made clear that there was no controlling
precedent for the issue.311 Although the Tribe cited to the
Supreme Court’s FMC decision, the PTAB was unpersuaded,
reasoning that there is no “federal court or Board precedent
suggesting that FMC’s holding with respect to state sovereign
immunity can or should be extended to an assertion of tribal
immunity in similar federal administrative proceedings.”312 The
board also reasoned that there are differences between the state
and tribal doctrines that indicate tribal immunity should not
apply to IPRs.313
Furthermore, the board stated that because the patent
statutes are generally applicable, they apply equally to Indian
tribes.314 In support of this proposition, the PTAB relied on a
nonbinding Ninth Circuit test that delineated exceptions for
when generally applicable statutes do not apply to Indian
tribes.315
In doing so, the PTAB ignored Supreme Court
307

Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *3.
309
Id. at *2–3.
310
Id. at *1.
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Id. at *3–4.
312
Id. at *3.
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Id. at *4.
314
Id. at *4–5.
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Id. at *5 (quoting Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113,
1116 (9th Cir. 1985)).
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precedent that states “[t]he baseline position, we have often held,
is tribal immunity; and ‘to abrogate such immunity, Congress
must “unequivocally” express that purpose.’ ”316
Ultimately, the PTAB implicitly engaged in the FMC
assessment that it explicitly dismissed as inapplicable to tribal
immunity.317 The board reasoned that unlike civil litigation,
IPRs do not involve a petitioner seeking a form of relief, do not
require the board to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
patentee, do not require the patentee’s participation, and instead
allow a final determination by the board regardless of a
settlement between the parties.318 In light of these differences,
the PTAB was of the opinion that tribal sovereign immunity
could not terminate an IPR proceeding.319
The board then went on to reason that “[e]ven assuming
arguendo that the Tribe [was] entitled to assert immunity,
termination of the[] proceedings [was] not warranted” because
the license agreements “transferred ‘all substantial rights’ in the
challenged patents back to Allergan.”320 As a result, the Tribe
was not an indispensable party, so even if tribal sovereign
immunity applied, the proceedings could continue without the
Tribe’s presence.321
3.

The Federal Circuit Decision

After the PTAB issued its decision on February 23, 2018, the
Tribe and Allergan appealed the decision to the Federal
Circuit.322 In deciding the issue, the court first acknowledged the
status of Native American tribes as “domestic dependent nations”
with “inherent sovereign immunity” that requires clear

316
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 790 (2014) (alterations
omitted) (quoting C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 532
U.S. 411, 418 (2001)).
317
Mylan I, 2018 WL 1100950, at *6 (stating that “an inter partes review
proceeding is not the type of ‘suit’ to which an Indian tribe would traditionally enjoy
immunity under the common law” and then proceeding to distinguish the
characteristics of IPRs from civil litigation (citation omitted)).
318
Id. at *6–7.
319
Id. at *7.
320
Id. at *7–8.
321
Id. at *15.
322
See Mylan II, 896 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.
1547 (2019). As stated earlier, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over all
patent matters, so all PTAB decisions that are appealed are decided by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See supra text accompanying notes
223–225.
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congressional abrogation to subject them to suit.323 The court
then went on to discuss the Supreme Court’s FMC decision and
noted that “[a]lthough the precise contours of tribal sovereign
immunity differ from those of state sovereign immunity, the
FMC analysis is instructive” to apply in this case.324
In applying the FMC test to IPR proceedings, the court noted
four factors that distinguish IPRs from civil litigation and lead to
the conclusion that tribal sovereign immunity is not implicated
in IPRs.325 The first main factor was that unlike civil litigation
where courts are required to adjudicate all complaints that are
filed, the director of the USPTO has “broad discretion in deciding
whether to institute review.”326 The court made clear that the
director’s decision not to institute an IPR can be based on a
number of factors ranging from the merits to a party’s status as a
sovereign, and in exercising such discretion, the director acts as a
politically accountable federal official.327
Such political
accountability affords tribes the “dignity that is consistent with
their status as sovereign entities”328 and makes institution of an
IPR more akin to “cases in which an agency [independently]
chooses whether to institute a proceeding” based on outside
information supplied by a third party, which is allowed under
FMC.329
The second distinction that the court noted was that unlike
civil litigation, once an IPR proceeding is initiated, the PTAB has
the right to continue the proceeding even if the petitioner chooses
not to be an active participant.330 In fact, the director even has
the ability to participate in the appeals process of IPR
decisions.331 Because of this factor, the court likened IPR
proceedings to an agency “reconsidering its own grant of a public
franchise.”332

323
Mylan II, 896 F.3d at 1325 (quoting Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991)).
324
Id. at 1326.
325
Id. at 1327.
326
Id. (citing Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138
S. Ct. 1365, 1371 (2018)).
327
Id.
328
Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002).
329
Mylan II, 896 F.3d at 1327.
330
Id. at 1328.
331
Id. (quoting Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016)).
332
Id.
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The third factor relied on by the court focused on the
procedural rules that govern IPRs.333 The court noted that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for plaintiffs to make
“significant amendments” to their complaints, whereas in IPRs,
petitioners are only permitted to make minor “clerical or
typographical corrections” to their petitions.334 Furthermore, a
patentee may amend the claims of her patent in the middle of
IPRs, which plaintiffs are not permitted to do to their complaints
in civil litigation.335 Finally, while the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure allow various methods of discovery in civil litigation,
discovery in IPRs is limited to deposing witnesses who submit
affidavits or declarations and “what is otherwise necessary in the
interest of justice.”336 And as it turns out, “what is otherwise
necessary in the interest of justice” rarely includes live
testimony.337
The final factor relied on by the court is the fact that IPR
proceedings serve the same purpose as inter partes
reexamination, which as the Tribe conceded, tribal sovereign
immunity would not apply to.338 Quoting the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, the
court reiterated that IPR and IPX “have the same ‘basic
purposes, namely to reexamine an agency decision.’ ”339 Because
the Tribe conceded that tribal sovereign immunity would not
apply in IPX, which has the same purpose as IPR, the court
concluded that it also does not apply to IPR patent
reconsiderations.340 Shortly after the Federal Circuit issued its
decision, the Tribe and Allergan filed petitions for the court to
333

See id.
Id. (citation omitted).
335
Id.
336
Id.
337
Id. at 1328–29 (citing Ultratec, Inc. v. CaptionCall, LLC, 872 F.3d 1267, 1270
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
338
Id. at 1329. Being that the court merely mentioned it in passing, it is unclear
exactly why the Tribe would concede that tribal sovereign immunity would not apply
to IPX proceedings. Perhaps it was a way for the Tribe to ease the court’s
apprehension about allowing tribal sovereign immunity to shield patents from
review by showing the court that even if it were to allow tribal sovereign immunity
in IPRs, there are still other post-grant proceedings that can be used to review an
issued patent—although IPXs no longer exist. Or perhaps it was the tribe trying to
set IPRs apart from IPXs to make IPRs seem more akin to traditional litigation.
Nonetheless, whatever the Tribe’s reasoning may have been, it evidently did not
work out in its favor.
339
Id. (quoting Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016)).
340
Id.
334
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rehear the issue en banc, which were denied on October 22,
2018.341 On December 20, 2018, the Tribe and Allergan filed a
petition for writ of certiorari, which was denied by the Supreme
Court on April 15, 2019.342
C.

The Previously Untenable Inconsistency of the PTAB and
Federal Circuit Decisions

In reading the PTAB’s five state sovereign immunity
decisions and both the PTAB’s and Federal Circuit’s Mylan
Pharmaceuticals decisions, it is clear that something does not
add up. Although all of the PTAB’s state sovereign immunity
decisions did not result in a complete termination of the
proceeding,343 the one consistent factor in each of those decisions
was the PTAB’s determination that state sovereign immunity
may be asserted in IPRs because civil litigation and IPRs are
sufficiently similar to each other.344 In contrast, the PTAB’s
decision in Mylan I made clear that tribal sovereign immunity
did not apply in IPRs because of, among other things, the
differences between civil litigation and IPR proceedings.345
341
See Dave Simpson, Allergan, Tribe Want PTAB Immunity Denial Reheard En
Banc, LAW360 (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1075198/allergantribe-want-ptab-immunity-denial-reheard-en-banc; Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v.
Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. 2018-1638 (Fed. Cir. filed Oct. 22, 2018) (per curiam)
(denying petition for rehearing en banc).
342
See Mylan III, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mylan
III, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (No. 18-899).
343
While the Covidien proceeding and the NeoChord proceeding resulted in
complete termination due to state sovereign immunity, see NeoChord, Inc. v. Univ.
of Md., No. IPR2016-00208, 2017 Pat. App. LEXIS 12969, at *31 (P.T.A.B. May 23,
2017); Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPR2016-01274, 2017
WL 4015009, at *17 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017), the Reactive Surfaces proceeding
continued after the dismissal of the Regents of the University of Minnesota
proceeding because Toyota, which is not a state entity, was a co-owner of the patent
in question, and thus the Regents was not an indispensable party. Reactive Surfaces
Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-01914, 2017 WL 2992429, at *7
(P.T.A.B. July 13, 2017). Further, the LSI proceeding and the Ericsson proceeding
were not terminated because although the Regents of the University of Minnesota is
a state entity, it filed patent infringement suits regarding the patents in question,
which was deemed to be a waiver of state sovereign immunity. See LSI Corp. v.
Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01068, 2017 WL 6517562, at *4
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017); Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR201701186, 2017 WL 6517563, at *4 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017).
344
LSI, 2017 WL 6517562, at *2; Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *2; Reactive
Surfaces, 2017 WL 2992429, at *3; NeoChord, 2017 Pat. App. LEXIS 12969, at *14;
Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *11.
345
See Mylan I, No. IPR2016-01127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *6–7 (P.T.A.B. Feb
23, 2018) (stating that “an inter partes review proceeding is not the type of ‘suit’ to
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The PTAB’s Internal Inconsistency

The PTAB’s treatment of IPRs in its state sovereign
immunity decisions is internally inconsistent with the PTAB’s
own treatment of IPRs in its tribal immunity decision.346 Indeed,
a closer look at the board’s treatment of the two different
doctrines shows that in analyzing the characteristics of IPRs, the
board highlighted characteristics that were similar to civil
litigation in the state immunity proceedings and highlighted
characteristics that distinguished IPRs from civil litigation in the
tribal immunity proceeding.347 Perhaps this inconsistency is the
result of the board’s realization that the Saint Regis Mohawk
transaction could open the floodgates to a trend of tribes and
states “rent[ing]” out sovereign immunity to private patent
owners to avoid IPR.348 In realizing this, it is possible that the
PTAB decided to narrow the reach of its state sovereign
immunity holdings by (1) carving out a waiver exception,349 and
(2) holding that FMC does not apply to the tribal doctrine so that
it could reach a different holding as to tribal immunity.350

which an Indian tribe would traditionally enjoy immunity under the common law”
and then proceeding to discuss the characteristics that are unique to IPR
proceedings (citation omitted)).
346
Compare Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *11, with Mylan I, 2018 WL
1100950, at *6–7.
347
Compare Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *11 (noting that IPRs (1) are
adversarial because they involve a third party petitioner contesting the validity of a
patent owner’s patent by petitioning to the USPTO, (2) are set into motion by a third
party’s filing of a petition, which is similar to a complaint, (3) share similar rules
and procedures with civil litigation to a limited extent, and (4) have judges whose
roles are similar to those of Article III judges), with Mylan I, 2018 WL 1100950, at
*6–7 (noting that IPRs (1) do not provide any form of relief to the petitioner, (2) do
not involve any exercise of personal jurisdiction, (3) do not require participation by
the parties for the PTAB to reach a final decision, and (4) may be continued by the
PTAB after the parties settle their dispute).
348
See Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017
WL 4619790, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017) (“The Court has serious concerns about
the legitimacy of the tactic that Allergan and the Tribe have employed. The essence
of the matter is this: Allergan . . . has paid the Tribe to allow Allergan . . . to
rent . . . the Tribe’s sovereign immunity in order to defeat the pending IPR
proceedings . . . .”); see also Susan Decker, Judges Criticize Allergan’s Use of
Mohawk Tribe’s Sovereignty, BLOOMBERG (June 4, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2018-06-04/allergan-use-of-tribe-s-sovereignty-called-risk-topatent-system (quoting the Association for Accessible Medicines’ assertion that
“Allergan’s immunity-renting transaction with the tribe is the first of its kind, but if
the gambit succeeds, it is sure not to be the last”).
349
See LSI, 2017 WL 6517562, at *4; Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *4.
350
Mylan I, 2018 WL 1100950, at *3–4.

2019]

2.

PATENTLY INCONSISTENT

281

Inconsistency Between the PTAB and the Federal Circuit

Regardless of the rationale for the PTAB’s own internal
inconsistency, the bigger concern is the inconsistency between
the Federal Circuit’s decision in Mylan II and the PTAB’s state
sovereign immunity decisions. The Federal Circuit’s decision in
Mylan II relied on the FMC framework to determine that IPRs
are “both functionally and procedurally different from district
court litigation.”351 Because of this difference, it concluded that
tribal sovereign immunity cannot be asserted in IPR
proceedings.352
Although the Federal Circuit made sure to clarify that it was
only deciding the applicability of tribal sovereign immunity to
IPRs and not the applicability of state sovereign immunity, the
court’s holding and rationale could apply equally to the state
doctrine.353 However, since the court’s holding was limited to
deciding the applicability of tribal sovereign immunity, it is not
binding precedent on the PTAB as to state sovereign
immunity.354 As a result, the PTAB must dismiss IPRs where
state sovereign immunity is asserted because of its own
precedent that IPRs and civil litigation are similar,355 but it
cannot dismiss IPRs where tribal sovereign immunity is asserted
because of the Federal Circuit’s precedent that IPRs and civil
litigation are different.356 This has created an inconsistency
between the Federal Circuit’s holding and the PTAB’s prior
holdings.357
The inconsistency between the Federal Circuit and the PTAB
is underscored by the fact that seven different states and two
351
Mylan II, 896 F.3d 1322, 1326, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.
1547 (2019).
352
Id. at 1329.
353
Id. (“In this case we are only deciding whether tribal immunity applies in
IPR. While we recognize there are many parallels, we leave for another day the
question of whether there is any reason to treat state sovereign immunity
differently.”).
354
Id.
355
Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPR2016-01274, 2017
WL 4015009, at *11 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017). Note, however, that the PTAB does not
have to dismiss the IPR if the waiver exception is implicated or if the state is a
dispensable party. See LSI Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR201701068, 2017 WL 6517562, at *4 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017); Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP
v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-01914, 2017 WL 2992429, at *7 (P.T.A.B. July
13, 2017).
356
Mylan II, 896 F.3d at 1329.
357
Compare Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *11, with Mylan II, 896 F.3d at
1329.
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state universities filed amicus briefs in support of Allergan and
the Tribe’s petition for a rehearing en banc that was filed on
August 20, 2018.358 In their briefs, the states and universities
made clear that despite the court’s limitation of its holding to
tribal sovereign immunity, the reasoning that was used by the
court could apply equally to the states’ immunity from IPR
proceedings.359
As a result, the states would be equally
vulnerable to challenges on state-owned patents, despite current
favorable PTAB precedent.360
IV. NEITHER TRIBAL NOR STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY SHOULD
APPLY TO IPRS
Although the PTAB has continually been of the opinion that
IPRs and civil litigation are sufficiently similar when state
sovereign immunity is asserted, it clearly does not feel that the
two proceedings are similar when tribal sovereign immunity is
asserted.361 The Federal Circuit agrees with the PTAB as it
pertains to the tribal doctrine, but the court has not explicitly
made its opinion known regarding the state doctrine.362
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit’s Mylan II decision can be
applied equally to state sovereign immunity.363 For the reasons
that follow, this Note argues that the Federal Circuit’s rationale
and holdings in both Mylan II and LSI Corp. are correct and
should be applied to prohibit both tribal and state sovereign
immunity from being asserted in IPRs.
A.

IPR Proceedings Are Significantly Different from Civil
Litigation

Since a large part of both the PTAB’s decisions and the
Federal Circuit’s decision relied on a comparison of IPR

358
Ryan Davis, States Back Tribe, Allergan Fed. Circ. Bid for PTAB Immunity,
LAW360 (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1080924/states-back-tribeallergan-fed-circ-bid-for-ptab-immunity.
359
Id.
360
Id.
361
Compare Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *11 (holding that state sovereign
immunity applies in IPRs), with Mylan I, No. IPR2016-01127, 2018 WL 1100950, at
*6–7 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (holding that tribal sovereign immunity does not apply
in IPRs).
362
Mylan II, 896 F.3d at 1329 (finding that “[i]n IPR, the agency proceedings
are both functionally and procedurally different from district court litigation” but
noting that it was leaving the question of state sovereign immunity for another day).
363
See supra text accompanying note 353.
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characteristics to civil litigation characteristics, an independent
analysis of these characteristics is important to illustrate why
the Federal Circuit’s holding is correct.
1.

Initiation and Initial Filings

First, as noted by the Federal Circuit,364 IPR proceedings are
instituted by the director of the USPTO at his or her discretion
based upon information presented in a third party’s petition.365
By contrast, a civil action is commenced in federal court upon a
plaintiff’s filing of a complaint.366 Although one might analogize
the director’s ability to decline to institute an IPR to a court’s
ability to dismiss a lawsuit for failure to state a claim, such an
analogy would be inapt as a court’s ability to dismiss for this
reason depends on a defendant raising this as a defense.367
Moreover, the USPTO director’s decision to decline to institute
an IPR is “final and nonappealable,”368 whereas if a court
dismisses a lawsuit for failure to state a claim, the court’s
decision to dismiss may be appealed by the plaintiff.369
Additionally, whereas defendants in civil litigation are
required to respond to a complaint within twenty-one days of its
filing,370 the default rule in IPR proceedings is that patentees
have up to three months from the date of notice of the third
party’s petition to file a preliminary response371 and “three
months from the date the inter partes review was instituted” to

364

See supra text accompanying notes 326–327.
See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct.
1365, 1371 (2018) (“The decision whether to institute inter partes review is
committed to the Director’s discretion.” (citing Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136
S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016))); 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018) (“The Director may not
authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that
the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims
challenged in the petition.”).
366
FED. R. CIV. P. 3.
367
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
368
35 U.S.C. § 314(d); see also Brief Amici Curiae of Intellectual Property
Professors in Support of Appellees at 6, Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp.,
926 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1559) [hereinafter Brief of IP Professors]
(stating that “the Patent Office has the unreviewable discretion to deny any
petition”).
369
See, e.g., Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121,
1124 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (reviewing a district court’s 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to
state a claim on appeal).
370
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1).
371
37 C.F.R. § 42.107(b) (2018).
365
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file a non-preliminary response to the third party’s petition.372
This difference is significant because the Supreme Court has
noted that motion practice is a factor to consider in deciding
applicability of sovereign immunity to agency proceedings,373 and
the fact that defendants in traditional litigation have only one
chance to respond to a complaint within twenty-one days of its
filing, whereas IPRs provide the patentee with two different
three-month periods to respond to a third-party petition,
underscores the non-adversarial nature of IPRs as compared to
civil litigation.374 Further illustrating this difference between
litigation and IPRs is the fact that if a defendant does not file a
response to a complaint in federal court, default judgment may
be entered against him or her,375 while a patentee holding a
patent being petitioned for review may waive the right to a
preliminary response without risking default judgment.376
2.

Discovery

Further distinguishing IPRs from civil litigation are the
different rules governing discovery in each. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure call for a broad scope of discovery that allows
parties to “obtain . . . any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to
any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the
case.”377 By allowing such a broad scope for discovery, parties in
litigation have the discretion to choose from an arsenal of
discovery options such as conducting depositions,378 serving
written interrogatories,379 demanding inspection or document
production,380 and requesting admissions.381
372

Id. § 42.120(b).
See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 757 (2002); see
also Brief of IP Professors, supra note 368, at 5–6 (explaining the difference between
motion practice in traditional litigation and motion practice in IPRs).
374
See supra text accompanying notes 370–372.
375
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1), 55(a); see also Brief of IP Professors, supra note
368, at 6 (stating that failing to respond to a complaint in federal court can lead to
default judgment against defendant).
376
37 C.F.R. § 42.107(b); see also Brief of IP Professors, supra note 368, at 6
(stating that failing to respond to an IPR petition cannot lead to default judgment
against patentee). For more on default judgment and non-participation by the
patentee, see infra notes 393–396 and accompanying text.
377
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also Brief of IP Professors, supra note 368, at 8–9
(explaining the difference between discovery in traditional litigation and discovery
in IPRs).
378
FED. R. CIV. P. 28(a).
379
FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a).
380
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a).
373
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In contrast to the large variety of discovery options available
in civil litigation, the PTAB has readily conceded that discovery
in IPRs is of a limited nature.382 Specifically, IPR discovery only
allows “the deposition of witnesses submitting affidavits or
declarations; and what is otherwise necessary in the interest of
justice.”383 Thus, if a party seeks additional discovery, the party
must either receive the opposing party’s consent or show that
additional discovery is in the interest of justice.384
3.

Article III Standing

Another major difference between civil litigation and IPRs is
that an IPR does not require the petitioner to satisfy the
requirements of Article III standing to file a petition.385 This is
an important factor to consider in distinguishing the two because
while a party only needs to be someone other than the patent
owner to file a petition for an IPR proceeding,386 in civil litigation
the plaintiff is required to meet several requirements illustrating
that they have an interest in the outcome of a case in order to
proceed to a final decision.387

381

FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(1).
See Garmin Int’l., Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC, No. IPR2012-00001, 2013
WL 11311697, at *2 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 5, 2013) (discussing the scope of discovery in IPR
proceedings and then noting that such rules are “significantly different from the
scope of discovery generally available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”);
see also Brief of IP Professors, supra note 368, at 8–9 (discussing the difference
between discovery in IPRs and discovery in traditional litigation).
383
35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5) (2018); see also Brief of IP Professors, supra note 368, at
8–9 (stating that beyond limited preliminary discovery, the IPR discovery rules only
allow what is “in the interest of justice”).
384
See 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(2) (2018); Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 887
F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Under the Board’s procedures, the burden is on
the party seeking discovery to show that the requested discovery would be likely to
produce favorable evidence.”).
385
See 35 U.S.C. § 311(a); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131,
2143–44 (2016) (citation omited); see also Brief of IP Professors, supra note 368, at 6,
15 (discussing the lack of requirements for IPR petitioners to have Article III
standing).
386
35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (“[A] person who is not the owner of a patent may file with
the Office a petition to institute an inter partes review of the patent.”).
387
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (stating that
the constitutional minimum for standing requires the plaintiff to show (1) an injury
in fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct, and
(3) a likelihood of redressing the injury with a favorable decision (citations omitted)).
If the plaintiff does not illustrate these three elements, the case will be dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., La Botz v. FEC, 61 F. Supp. 3d 21, 27
(D.C. Cir. 2014); Harnage v. Dzurenda, 176 F. Supp. 3d 40, 45 (D. Conn. 2016).
382
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This principle is emphasized even further by the fact that
the petitioner may petition the PTAB for an IPR and participate
in that IPR if it is instituted, but if the PTAB reaches a decision
that does not satisfy the petitioner, it cannot appeal the decision
to the Federal Circuit if it does not illustrate that it has Article
III standing to sue in federal court.388 This caveat once again
underscores that the purpose of IPRs is to ensure the patent
system’s efficiency by reexamining previously granted patents for
validity alone, which is completely distinguishable from the
resolution of cases or controversies between multiple parties that
occurs in federal courts.389
4.

Duration of Proceedings & Final Decisions

Finally, one of the most important differences between the
IPRs and civil litigation is the duration of each proceeding. In
civil litigation, courts are not constrained by any deadline by
which they must reach a decision in a case.390 In fact, the
average length of patent litigation ranges from twenty-four to
thirty-six months.391 This is in stark contrast to IPRs, which are
required to reach a final decision within one year of the director’s
instituting of the proceeding, with the possibility of the director

388

See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2143–44 (citation omitted); Phigenix, Inc. v.
Immunogen, Inc., 845 F.3d 1168, 1171–72, 1176 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that an
IPR petitioner did not have standing to appeal the PTAB’s final decision in federal
court).
389
See Brief of IP Professors, supra note 368, at 2. Compare Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct.
at 2144 (second ellipsis in original) (“[T]he purpose of [inter partes review] is not
quite the same as the purpose of district court litigation. . . . [I]nter partes review
helps protect the public’s ‘paramount interest in seeing that patent
monopolies . . . are kept within their legitimate scope.’ ” (quoting Precision
Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945))), with U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases [or
controversies] . . . arising under this Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United
States.”).
390
Mark A. Fellows & Roger S. Haydock, Federal Court Special Masters: A Vital
Resource in the Era of Complex Litigation, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1269, 1289
(2005) (illustrating that over the years, the average length of litigation has varied).
391
Kyle Pietari, Note: An Overview and Comparison of U.S. and Japanese
Patent Litigation, Part II, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 970, 973 (2016); see
Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 237, 299 (2006).
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extending the proceeding for an additional six months “for good
cause.”392
Moreover, the presence or participation of the petitioner and
patent holder is not required in order for the PTAB to reach a
final decision within the one-year time constraint,393 as IPRs
solely focus on deciding patent validity, whereas adversarial
patent litigation tends to be focused on infringement liability.394
In fact, the PTAB may continue an IPR proceeding and make a
final determination as to a patent’s validity even if the patentee
and third party petitioner come to a settlement agreement.395
This greatly differs from civil litigation, which calls for the court
to dismiss a suit upon a settlement between the parties.396
These distinctions demonstrate the dissimilar purposes that
the two proceedings serve. The shorter duration of IPRs and the
PTAB’s ability to reach a final decision even after the parties
settle show that the true purpose of IPRs is to provide a “quick,
inexpensive, and reliable” means of ensuring and improving the
quality of the patent system by reexamining a prior patent
grant.397 The longer duration of civil litigation and the dismissal
of suits upon settlement show that the purpose of Article III
courts is to resolve “all Cases [or controversies], in Law and

392
35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (2018); see also Brief of IP Professors, supra note 368,
at 7 (contrasting the requirement for IPRs to reach final disposition within one year
with the lack of a time limit for traditional litigation).
393
See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); Microsoft Corp. v. Global Techs., Inc., No. IPR201600663, 2017 WL 2417332, at *3 (P.T.A.B. June 2, 2017) (entering a final written
decision adverse to patent owner despite the owner’s lack of appearance before the
board); Old Republic Gen. Ins. Grp., Inc. v. Owner of U.S. Patent No. 6,519,581 B1,
No. IPR2015-01956, 2017 Pat. App. LEXIS 8446, at *5 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 18, 2017)
(proceeding to a final written decision without the appearance of the patent owner
before the board); see also Brief of IP Professors, supra note 368, at 16 (discussing
how the Patent Office can reach a final decision without the patentee’s or
petitioner’s participation).
394
See supra text accompanying note 258.
395
See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(a) (2018); see also Mylan II, 896
F.3d 1322, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Dyk, J., concurring) (“And if the third party settles,
the proceeding does not end, and the USPTO may continue on to a final written
decision.”), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019).
396
See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).
397
S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 20 (2008) (noting that inter partes reexamination
should be replaced by a new post-grant review that provides a “quick, inexpensive,
and reliable” means of reevaluating patent validity); see Cuozzo Speed Techns., LLC
v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016); H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011)
(discussing the purpose of the America Invents Act); see also Brief of IP Professors,
supra note 368, at 12 (stating that the purpose of IPRs is to take a second look at a
prior patent grant to ensure that patents are kept within their scope).
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Equity, arising under th[e] Constitution, [and] the Laws of the
United States” by hearing each party’s side of the story.398
B.

Policy Implications of Allowing Sovereign Immunity in
IPR Proceedings

To allow any form of sovereign immunity to prevail as a
defense to IPRs would circumvent the very purpose of the patent
system and would make sovereign-owned patents more valuable
than patents owned by the general public.399 This is evident
when taking a closer look at the Supreme Court’s Oil States
decision.400
As
discussed
earlier,
Oil
States
addressed
the
constitutionality of IPRs, but in doing so, it had some
implications for when sovereign immunity should be allowed to
be asserted in IPRs.401 As the Oil States Court pointed out,
“[i]nter partes review is ‘a second look at an earlier
administrative grant of a patent,’ ” and in doing so, “[t]he Board
considers the same statutory requirements that the PTO
considered when granting the patent.”402 By having the PTAB
reexamine granted patents, the USPTO “protects ‘the public’s
paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies are kept
within their legitimate scope.’ ”403 Moreover, as the Oil States
Court made clear, the USPTO grants patents on the condition
that they may potentially be revoked upon a reexamination at a
later date,404 which is well within their authority.405
Since the Oil States Court held that IPRs are constitutional
and that it is entirely permissible for the USPTO to grant
398

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
See Tejas N. Narechania, An Offensive Weapon?: An Empirical Analysis of
the “Sword” of State Sovereign Immunity in State-Owned Patents, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 1574, 1611–12 (2010).
400
See generally Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC,
138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).
401
Supra Section II.C.
402
Id. at 1374 (quoting Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144).
403
Id. (quoting Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144).
404
Id. (quoting Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2137); see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018)
(emphasis added) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.”); id. § 311(a) (authorizing third parties to petition for inter
partes review of a patent and request for such patent to be cancelled).
405
See Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1374–75 (illustrating that it is entirely
permissible for the USPTO to grant patents subject to later reexamination and
cancellation).
399
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patents subject to a later reexamination and revocation, allowing
tribes and states to avoid IPR proceedings would make their
patents more valuable than those of non-tribal and non-state
entities or individuals.406
In fact, empirical evidence has
suggested that the ability to shield a patent from review by
asserting sovereign immunity has led to heightened
aggressiveness with sovereign patent licensing.407 This is a direct
result of the fact that would-be petitioners are unable to request
a reexamination in IPR or file suit in district court.408 In turn,
sovereign patentees and assignees are left with all of the
bargaining power in licensing agreements, which leads to
increased licensing costs and causes (1) a heightened cost of
innovation for others, and (2) a decrease in overall efficiency of
the patent system.409
In contrast, since privately owned patents are subject to
IPRs there is always a chance for post-grant invalidation. This
has the potential to dissuade investors or potential licensees from
doing business with private patent owners and instead doing
business with sovereign patent owners of similar technology.
Indeed, IPRs have a reputation for being “challenger friendly”
due to statistics that show a high percentage of patent claims
challenged in IPR are deemed unpatentable or voluntarily
cancelled by the patent owner before the board reaches a final
decision.410 Thus, allowing this kind of circumvention of the IPR
406
See Narechania, supra note 399, at 1612 (showing that the ability of states to
assert state sovereign immunity provides them with more leverage in negotiating
license agreements, and thus allows states to reap increased profits from patent
licenses); see also Mylan I, No. IPR2016-01127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *6 (P.T.A.B.
Feb. 23, 2018) (“[T]he scope of the authority granted by Congress to the Patent
Office with respect to inter partes review proceedings is limited to assessing the
patentability of the challenged claims.”).
407
See Narechania, supra note 399, at 1612; see also Brief of IP Professors,
supra note 368, at 17 (stating that evidence suggests states are more aggressive
patent licensors since they are shielded from patent validity challenges in court).
408
See Narechania, supra note 399, at 1612.
409
See id. Further, the ability to shield a patent from IPR could lead to
unpredictability of patent ownership due to spontaneous patent assignments as a
method of avoiding review. See, e.g., Mylan II, 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019).
410
Justin Oliver et al., Is PTAB ‘Death Squad’ Just a Myth? INTELL. PROP.
MAG., June 2015, at 48, 48–49, https://www.intellectualpropertymagazine.com/
patent/is-ptab-death-squad-just-a-myth-109342.htm. From the inception of IPRs on
September 16, 2012, through October 31, 2018, there have been 9,292 petitions for
IPR filed with the PTAB. Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Trial Statistics: IPR, PGR,
CBM, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., at 10 (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/trial_statistics_oct_2018.pdf. Of these petitions, prior to
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process harms entrepreneurs, which directly undermines one of
the main goals of the AIA and the overall patent system.411
Moreover, since IPRs focus on novelty and nonobviousness of
the patent in question, and the novelty and nonobviousness
requirements prevent inventors from obtaining a patent on
public information, allowing sovereigns to avoid IPRs would
prevent the PTAB from ensuring that public information remains
in the public domain.412 As a result, the patent system’s purpose
would be thwarted.413
C.

Tribal Sovereign Immunity and State Sovereign Immunity
Should Receive Equal Treatment in IPRs Because They Are
Similar in Purpose and Function

As stated above, tribal and state sovereign immunity serve
the same function as each other with respect to the sovereigns
that they serve to protect, and thus, they should receive the same
treatment in IPRs.414 Tribes may not be sued by private
individuals, private entities, or states; and states may not be
sued by private individuals, private entities, or tribes.415
Although Congress’s ability to abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity has a broader scope than its ability to abrogate state
sovereign immunity,416 Congress has not chosen to do so, and
thus, tribal sovereign immunity can be said to stand on the same
institution of the IPR there have been 1,158 settled between the parties, 89
dismissed, 34 grants on requests for adverse judgment by the patentee, and 2,372
denied by the PTAB. Id. Further, of the 9,292 petitions there have been 4,783 IPRs
instituted by the PTAB, with 941 settling after institution, 52 dismissed by the
PTAB, 298 grants on requests for adverse judgment by the patentee, and 2,399 final
written decisions by the PTAB. Id. Of the 2,399 final written decisions there were
461 (19%) that did not deem any of the challenged patent claims to be invalid, 398
(17%) that deemed some of the challenged patent claims to be invalid, and 1,540
(64%) that deemed all of the challenged patent claims to be invalid. Id. This means
that 40% of the 4,783 IPRs that have been instituted since September 16, 2012, have
led to at least one challenged claim being invalidated, and of the 2,399 IPRs
reaching a final written decision, 81% have resulted in at least one challenged claim
being invalidated. See id.
411
See President Barack Obama, Remarks at the Signing of the America Invests
Act (Sept. 16, 2011), in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. S6, 2011 WL 5903407 (“[The America
Invents Act] will . . . help give entrepreneurs the protection and the confidence they
need to attract investment, to grow their businesses, and to hire more workers.”).
412
See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2018); Margo A. Bagley, Response, Still Patently
Unconstitutional: A Reply to Professor Nard, 88 MINN. L. REV. 239, 242 (2003).
413
See supra text accompanying notes 191–192.
414
See supra Section I.C.
415
See supra Section I.C.
416
See supra notes 176–177 and accompanying text.
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ground as state sovereign immunity.417 In fact, some are of the
opinion that tribal sovereign immunity is a stronger doctrine
than state sovereign immunity.418
Regardless of whether tribal sovereign immunity is actually
stronger than state sovereign immunity, it is unquestionably
equivalent to state sovereign immunity. Thus, since the Federal
Circuit is correct in its holding that tribal sovereign immunity
may not be asserted in IPRs, it must be equally true that state
sovereign immunity may not be asserted in IPRs.
CONCLUSION
Both tribal and state sovereign immunity have been
recognized as common law doctrines that predate the
Constitution and serve the purpose of according tribes and states
the dignity and respect that sovereign entities deserve. Despite
the fact that the two doctrines serve the same purpose and the
tribal doctrine has yet to be abrogated by Congress, the PTAB
has treated state sovereign immunity more favorably than tribal
sovereign immunity in IPR proceedings.
This has caused a logical inconsistency within the PTAB, as
well as an inconsistency between the Federal Circuit’s Mylan II
rationale and the PTAB’s state sovereign immunity precedent.
Furthermore, allowing states to avoid IPR proceedings due to
state sovereign immunity claims thwarts the ability of IPRs to
“protect the public’s ‘paramount interest in seeing that patent
monopolies . . . are kept within their legitimate scope,’ ”419 and,
more importantly, hinders the patent system’s goal to “promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”420
Because the characteristics and features of inter partes
review make the proceeding completely distinguishable from civil
litigation, the Federal Circuit was correct in Mylan II when it
held that “tribal sovereign immunity cannot be asserted in
IPRs”421 and in LSI Corp. when it held that state sovereign

417

See supra notes 176–177 and accompanying text.
See supra note 161.
419
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016) (ellipsis in
original) (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 816 (1945)).
420
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
421
Mylan II, 896 F.3d 1322, 1326, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.
1547 (2019).
418
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immunity cannot be asserted in IPRs.422 This is because (1) to
allow the states, or any sovereign for the matter, to successfully
assert sovereign immunity in IPRs would negatively affect
various policy concerns for the patent system, and (2) tribal
sovereign immunity and state sovereign immunity are relatively
equivalent doctrines to one another, so it would not make sense
to ban one doctrine and permit the other. As a result of the
foregoing, neither tribal sovereign immunity nor state sovereign
immunity should be applicable as a defense to inter partes review
proceedings.

422

2019).

Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1342 (Fed. Cir.

